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Articles
COLLEGE BULLIES-PRECURSORS TO CAMPUS VIOLENCE: WHAT
SHOULD UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGE ADMINISTRATORS
KNOW ABOUT THE LAW?
SusAN H. DUNCAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
D URING the past decade, concerned parents, academics, school ad-ministrators, and policymakers placed kindergarten through twelfth
grade (K-12) bullying on the social and legislative agenda. Through their
efforts, society is beginning to understand the true nature of bullying and
the price that is paid by allowing it to remain unchecked. Unfortunately,
the same level of interest and attention has not been devoted to post-ado-
lescent bullying, despite the continuing propensities of grade school and
high school bullies to torment others in college and later in the work-
place. The tragedies at Virginia Tech and other college campuses periodi-
cally remind us of the issues involved, but a sustained dialogue has yet to
occur.
Perhaps one explanation for the low levels of concern and under-
standing of bullying at the college level is that historically colleges have
been largely immune from liability for their students' actions. This protec-
tion has given colleges and universities little motivation to address the
problem. Title IX signaled a shift towards holding schools liable for peer-
on-peer conduct-albeit gender-based-but very high standards make it a
near-illusory remedy. As society becomes more aware of and concerned
with post-adolescent bullying, colleges should anticipate a shift, whether
tort-based or otherwise, towards a greater risk of liability for peer-on-peer
conduct at the college level. Accordingly, colleges should begin imple-
menting appropriate practices and policies to prevent bullying-related
harm to students and avoid the risk of liability.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of
Louisville; J.D., 1991, University of Louisville School of Law; B.A., 1987, Miami
University. The author wishes to thank Kevin Duncan, Megan Reese, and Jennifer
Weinhold for their helpful edits and advice.
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Confusion currently exists among college and university administra-
tors about the legal liability risks their schools face due to bullying con-
duct. Stringent substantive requirements requiring actual knowledge and
deliberate indifference by school officials make Title IX and Section 1983
suits fruitless remedies to most injuries resulting from peer-on-peer con-
duct. Although some factual situations may be so egregious as to meet
these high standards, much of the bullying present on college campuses
or the institutions' responses will not rise to the level required by courts to
find liability. State civil rights statutes offer some hope for plaintiffs be-
cause they may have lower standards of proof compared to the federal
harassment statutes, but a gap remains between state and federal harass-
ment statutes. Statutes that address bullying in schools fail to fill the gap
because they address only K-12 bullying and offer no private cause of ac-
tion for victims of bullying. Without a private cause of action to provide
victims with a remedy in court, these anti-bullying statutes remain virtually
ineffective. In addition, each of the legal actions discussed above only ad-
dresses bullying based on a protected class but fails to address the broader
and more prolific bullying of those not belonging to a protected class.
Consequently, until more comprehensive bullying laws are passed, plain-
tiffs must rely on other tort or contract claims. Even those claims might
not help, however, because courts have traditionally defined duty, foresee-
ability, and causation in the student-university context in a manner that
insulates colleges from liability. A slight ray of hope for plaintiffs resides
in recent decisions, which indicate courts' growing willingness to recon-
ceptualize the student-university relationship and hold universities and
colleges liable for student safety.
Regardless of legal liability, colleges should not ignore bullying on
campus because colleges' mission of providing a positive educational envi-
ronment includes developing attitudes of tolerance in their students and
promoting public health. Campus responses must be multifaceted to in-
clude intervention, prevention, and enforcement components. An effec-
tive prevention component must be campus-wide, both systems-oriented
(restructuring the social environment of the college) and individual-ori-
ented (addressing issues with individual students), and not time-limited.1
Studies show that a comprehensive approach to prevention can change
student behavior and attitudes.2 When designing such approaches, and
1. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Exploring the Nature and Prevention of Bullying:
Day 4-The Need For a Comprehensive Approach, http://www.ed.gov/admins/
lead/safety/training/bullying/bullying pg26.html.
2. SeeJAmEs A. Fox ET AL., BULLYING PREVENTION IS CRIME PREVENTION (2003),
available at http://www.fightcrime.org/sites/default/files/reports/Bullying
Report.pdf; Doug Toft, Owleus Bullying Prevention Program: One of the Most Effective
Tools to Prevent Bullying, HAZELDEN VOICE, Winter 2007, available at http://
www.hazelden.org/web/public/vc07olweus.page ("Six studies of the Olweus pro-
gram involving over 40,000 students indicate 30%-70% reductions in reports of
bullying. These occurred along with significant reductions in vandalism, fighting,
theft, and truancy.").
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especially when drafting any type of anti-bullying policies, colleges must
pay careful attention to First Amendment constraints.
As a precursor to formulating a comprehensive response, colleges
must better understand the nature of bullying on campus. Part II of this
Article furthers this goal by defining bullying and exploring its prevalence
at all levels of education and the workforce, as well as detailing its detri-
mental effects on the bully, the victim, and bystanders. Next, Part III of
this Article reviews and analyzes the possible legal theories plaintiffs might
use to recover from a university or college after being bullied. Even
though substantial barriers currently exist to finding a college or university
liable for bullying conduct, this Article urges colleges and universities to
shield their students from bullying on campus to avoid the detrimental
impact that bullying has on campus culture and to minimize incidents of
campus violence. In Part IV, this Article concludes by exploring how col-
leges and universities can best protect themselves from legal liability and
maintain a safe and respectful learning and living environment for their
students.
II. BULLYING AND ITS IMPACT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
A. What Is Bullying?
A common problem with predicting when an institution of higher
education may be liable for bullying, as well as in enacting and implement-
ing school anti-bullying policies, is assigning an appropriate definition to
bullying. Opponents of any type of legal response to bullying often cite
concerns of regulating protected speech or harmless conduct such as teas-
ing or flirting. Such insults or banter, however, should not be confused
with or used as an excuse to condone or ignore true acts of bullying, which
need to be viewed as acts of school violence. To avoid ensnaring pro-
tected conduct and free speech, legislation, regulation, and policy must be
drafted carefully. Although multiple and varying definitions of bullying
exist, most definitions incorporate these four characteristics:
1. Bullying involves intentional, and largely unprovoked, efforts
to harm another.
2. Bullying can be physical or verbal and direct or indirect in
nature.
3. Bullying involves repeated negative actions by one or more
persons against another.
4. Bullying, unlike teasing, centers upon an imbalance of physical
or psychological power.3
3. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Exploring the Nature and Prevention of Bullying:
Day 1-Bullying Myths and Facts, http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/train-
ing/bullying/bullying-pg3.html (last visited May 17, 2010). Commentators have
defined bullying as "the willful, conscious desire to hurt or threaten or frighten
someone else." See MARGARET JOHNSTONE ET AL., AcrION AGAINST BULLYING
(1991). Bullying is repeated oppression, psychological or physical, of a less power-
2010] 271
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Bullying also becomes difficult to discuss because it can incorporate
many behaviors that span a continuum of severity, including physical bul-
lying (punching, poking, strangling, hair pulling, beating, biting, inappro-
priate touching, and excessive tickling), emotional bullying (rejecting,
extorting, defaming, humiliating, blackmailing, manipulating friends, iso-
lating, ostracizing, and peer pressure), sexual bullying (exhibitionism,
voyeurism, sexual propositioning, sexual harassment, and abuse involving
physical contact and assault), and verbal bullying (hurtful name-calling,
teasing, and gossip). 4 Also, individuals or groups can perpetrate bullying.
A college's proper response and potential liability will necessarily depend
on the extent and nature of the bullying, as these behaviors differ in their
level of severity, with some even being illegal. Nonetheless, ignoring any
of the behaviors can be dangerous because the less serious actions may
easily escalate to more severe behavior.
B. Bullying Is a Real and Serious Problem
Bullying is a pervasive problem in schools. Studies in the United
States estimate that 30% of youths (5.7 million) were a bully, a target of
bullying, or both.5 According to the National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development's (NICHD) 1998 survey of youths in grades six
through ten, 3.2 million students reported that they were victims of bully-
ing and 3.7 million students reported that they bullied others.6 Other
countries have similar survey results, with some countries reporting even
higher rates of bullying incidents. 7 Some studies indicate bullying usually
"begins in elementary school, peaks in middle school, and diminishes but
does not disappear in high school."8
Although bullying continues into high school and college, much of
this behavior goes unreported. One likely explanation may be that bully-
ing continues across all ages, but the type of bullying changes from physi-
cal bullying to sexual or emotional bullying, which is more difficult to
ful person by a more powerful person or group of persons. See David P. Farring-
ton, Understanding and Preventing Bullying, 17 CRIME &JUST. 381 (1993). For many
more definitions, see U.S. Dep't of Educ., Exploring the Nature and Prevention of
Bullying: Other Definitions of Bullying, http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/
training/bullying/bullying pg4.html#definitions (last visited May 17, 2010). Con-
trast these definitions to teasing when students have equal physical or psychologi-
cal power and usually are friends who remain friends. See Dr. Dorothy Espelage,
Bullying: An Old Problem Gets New Attention, TEX. CLASSROoM TCHRs. AsS'N, http://
www.tcta.org/edmatters/trouble/bullying.htm (last visited May 17, 2010).
4. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 3.
5. See National Youth Violence Prevention Resource Center, Bullying Facts
and Statistics, http://www.safeyouth.org/scripts/faq/bullying.asp (last visited Nov.8, 2009).
6. U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 3.
7. See Fox ET AL., supra note 2; U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 3.
8. See, e.g., Bullying, ISSUE BRIEF (Maine Legislative Youth Advisory Council,
Augusta, Me.), Oct. 3, 2006, at 2, available at http://maine.gov/legis/opla/
lyacbullybrief.pdf.
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detect and is often more harmful and disruptive to learning.9 Another
likely factor contributing to underreporting of bullying in high school and
college is the transition from children living under their parents' care and
supervision to living "on their own." Likewise, once in the work force,
victims of bullying have their employer or supervisor to turn to in address-
ing such incidents and may do so if work performance is compromised as
a result of bullying. A college student entering into a new phase of inde-
pendence is less likely to know who to turn to with regard to personal
confrontations with a peer student.
Hardly an adolescent issue, bullying continues to be a major problem
in the workplace. 10 Studies find that bullying occurs frequently in the
workplace and is among the fastest growing complaints of American work-
ers." A 2007 U.S. Workplace Bullying Survey found workplace bullying to
be an epidemic, with fifty-four million people-amounting to 37% of
American workers-who have reported being the victims of bullying.1 2
Workplace bullying, like bullying in educational settings, results in victims
reporting a decrease in productivity due to efforts to avoid the bully or
worrying about the situation.13 A substantial number of bullied workers,
46%, consider changing jobs and 12% actually change jobs as a result of
being bullied.14
At least one court has taken notice of this type of bullying and consid-
ered expert testimony about workplace bullying at trial. In a recent case,
the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a $325,000 verdict for assault brought
by an operating room perfusionist (a person who operates the heart/lung
machine during open heart surgeries) against a cardiovascular surgeon,
who the perfunctionist claimed behaved as a workplace bully.15 The bully-
ing that gave rise to the assault claim occurred when the surgeon, angry
over the perfusionist's complaints to hospital administration regarding the
surgeon's treatment of other perfusionists, "aggressively and rapidly ad-
vanced on the plaintiff with clenched fists, piercing eyes, beet-red face,
popping veins, and scream[ed] and sw[ore] at him."' 6 The surgeon ar-
gued that the jury's award on the assault claim was unfairly influenced by
9. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 3.
10. See Mogens Arervold, Bullying at Work: A Discussion of Definitions and Preva-
lence, Based on an Empirical Study, 48 SCANDANAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 161 (2007); R.A.
Baron & J. H. Neuman, Workplace Aggression-The Iceberg Beneath the Tip of Workplace
Violence: Evidence on Its Forms, Frequency and Targets, 21 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 446 (1998).
For more articles on this subject, see New York Healthy Workplace Advocates,
www.nyhwa.org/4.html (last visited May 17, 2010).
11. See Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Under-
standing of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 30 (1999).
12. See WORKPLACE BULLYING INSr. & ZOGBY INT'L, U.S. WORKPLACE BULLYING
SURVEY (2007), available at http://www.workplacebullying.org/res/N-N-Zogby
2007.pdf.
13. See Ehrenreich, supra note 11, at n.238.
14. See id.
15. See Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790 (Ind. 2008).
16. Id. at 794.
2732010]
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expert testimony that labeled the surgeon's behavior "workplace bully-
ing."' 7 Among other alleged errors, the surgeon complained that the trial
court should have instructed the jury that the phrase "workplace bully" was
irrelevant to the perfusionist's claims and that workplace bullying is not
against the law.' 8 The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed, stating that
workplace bullying could be considered a form of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and, therefore, the trial court properly admitted the
expert testimony concerning workplace bullying.' 9
Although bullying is a well-documented problem in K-12 schools and
in the workforce, relatively little research exists concerning bullying in
postsecondary settings. Anecdotally, a growing concern among college
and graduate school professors is the perceived increase in student "inci-
vility, insubordination, and intimidation."2 0 Students not only perform
physically violent acts, such as the recent mass murders at colleges, but
also engage in verbal abuse directed towards professors and classmates. 2 '
The Internet provides a readily available venue for students to bully, and
several articles have been written recently on the phenomenon of cyber-
bullying.2 2 Law enforcement officials have even advised some colleges to
adopt policies and devote resources to this problem.2 3
Confirming educators' growing concern about the problem of bully-
ing, two recent studies specific to college-age students indicate that bully-
ing is not limited to younger age groups. The first study surveyed 1,025
undergraduate students. 24 Of that group, 33.4% reported witnessing a
student bully another student in college once or twice.25 An additional
17. See id. at 795-96.
18. See id. at 798.
19. See id. at 799.
20. See Helen Smith et al., Violence on Campus: Practical Recommendations for Le-
gal Educators (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 21, 2008) (citing
GERALD AMADA, COPING WITH THE DISRUPTIVE COLLEGE STUDENT (1999)), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=981497 .
21. See id. (quoting Alison Schneider, Insubordination and Intimidation Signal
the End of Decorum in Many Classrooms, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Mar.
27, 1998, at A12.
22. See, e.g., Juicy Campus, wwwjuicycampus.com; Kevin P. Brady & Kathleen
Conn, Bullying Without Borders: The Rise of Cyberbullying in America's Schools, Scri. Bus.
AFFAIRS 6, 8 (Oct. 2006); Press Release, Anne Milgram, N.J. Attorney Gen., Attor-
ney General Advises College Students to Be Alert to Cyber-Bullies and Sexual
Predators on the Internet (Aug. 26, 2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/
newsreleases08/pr20080826a.html; Alberto D. Morales, First Amendment Groups
Warn N.J. Attorney General of Broad 'Cyberbulling' Definition, STUDENT PREss L.
CENTER, Nov. 10, 2008, http://splc.org/newsflash-archives.asp?id=1831 &year=
2008. Although since closed, Juicy Campus was a popular website among college
students where they could post all types of anonymous gossip making it an ideal
platform for bullies to harass their victims.
23. See Press Release, supra note 22.
24. See Mark Chapell, Bullying in College by Students and Teachers, 39 ADOLEs-
CENCE 53, 56 (2004).
25. See id. at 58.
274 [Vol. 55: p. 269
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24.7% reported seeing bullying occur occasionally and 2.8% reported see-
ing it very frequently.26 Although slightly lower, over 40% of respondents
reported seeing a teacher bully a student compared to over 60% seeing
student-on-student bullying.27 These responses are consistent with bully-
ing in the workplace and confirm that bullying is likewise a fairly common
problem in college. Indeed, to think that bullying begins in K-12, stops in
college, and then begins again in the workplace defies common sense.
A 2006 study confirmed that although bullying does decrease as stu-
dents matriculate, it does not stop.2 8 In addition, college students were
more likely to be bullied if they had been bullied in elementary or high
school.29 Interestingly, unlike bullying in high school, the study reported
that no significant sex differences existed as to which gender was more
likely to be bullied in college, though the type of bullying experienced by
males differed from that experienced by females.3 0 In particular, males
were bullied physically and verbally more than female students, who en-
gaged in indirect or social bullying.3 ' Finally, the study indicated that
teachers and coaches primarily used verbal bullying followed in preva-
lence by social bullying, while two students reported physical bullying by
their coaches.3 2
Another rich source of data on college bullying is research exploring
bullying of college students who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans-
gender (LGBT), as well as bullying that occurs during hazing of students
who are initiated into some larger group. A recent National Gay and Les-
bian Task Force report found that 20% of the respondents feared for their
safety on campus and 36% of LGBT undergraduates experienced harass-
ment within the past year.33 To avoid intimidation, over half of the re-
spondents concealed their sexual identity from their classmates. Although
some respondents felt the university offered positive environments in
which to work and attend class, many respondents still found their cam-
puses hostile and homophobic.
Likewise, hazing continues to be a major problem facing universities.
Accurate numbers are often difficult to ascertain because of underreport-
ing. One study indicated that 95% of the hazing incidents identified by
26. See id.
27. See id. at 59.
28. See Mark S. Chapell et al., Bullying in Elementary, High School and College, 41
ADOLESCENCE 633, 633-34 (2006).
29. See id. at 642.
30. See id. at 643.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 641.
33. See SUsAN R. RANKIN, THE POLICY INST. OF THE NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN
TASK FORCE, CAMPUS CLIMATE FOR GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PEO-
PLE: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2003), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/
downloads/reports/reports/CampusClimate.pdf.
2752010]1
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students were not reported to campus officials. 34 Despite students' reluc-
tance to report incidents, it is clear that a large number of them are being
hazed.3 5 In a recent report from a national study on student hazing, 55%
of college students involved in clubs, teams, and organizations experience
hazing.3 6 These hazing experiences take many forms, from degrading an
individual, physical intimidation, making prank calls, or harassing others,
to drinking large amounts of alcoholic or non-alcoholic liquids that en-
danger a person's safety.
C. Why Should Colleges and Universities Be Concerned with Bullies?
Colleges and universities combating school violence should be con-
cerned with bullying because bullying is a form of school violence and
often leads to more severe acts of school violence. Unfortunately, most
administrators narrowly define school violence as incidents involving per-
sonal injuries such as school shootings. Instead, a better definition of
school violence would be "any behavior that violates a school's educational
mission or climate of respect or jeopardizes the intent of the school to be
free of aggression against persons or property, drugs, weapons, disrup-
tions, and disorder."3 7 This definition is not limited to a safe school set-
ting and also focuses on providing an appropriate learning environment.
Focusing on physical security measures alone such as keeping guns off
of campus will never solve the school violence problem. Schools also must
address underlying causes of high-profile violent incidents that often have
roots in bullying behavior. Bullying behavior should serve as a warning
sign to campus administrators because of its potential to escalate and lead
to other more serious types of campus violence such as "rape, assault,
fighting, hazing, dating violence, sexual harassment, hate and bias-related
violence,"3 8 or even "stalking, rioting, disorderly conduct, property crime,
and even self-harm and suicide."39
Although bullying may be at the lower end of the spectrum of school
violence, bullying harms the campus climate by producing detrimental
34. See ELIZABETH J. ALLAN & MARY MADDEN, HAZING IN VIEW: COLLEGE STU-
DENTS AT RISK, INITIAL FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL STUDY OF STUDENT HAZING
(2008), http://www.hazingstudy.org/publications/hazing-in-viewweb.pdf.
35. See Florence L. Denmark et al., Bullying and Hazing: A Form of Campus Har-
assment, in UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING CAMPUS VIOLENCE 27, 30 (Michele A.
Paludi ed., 2008).
36. See ALLAN & MADDEN, supra note 34.
37. just What Is "School Violence"?, NEWS BRIEF (Ctr. for the Prevention of Sch.
Violence, N.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Raleigh,
N.C.), May 2002, http://www.ncdjjdp.org/cpsv/pdf-files/newsbrief5_02.pdf.
38. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIMES ON CAMPUS: THE PROBLEM AND EF-
FORTS TO CONFRONT IT (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/
187249.pdf.
39. LINDA LANGFORD, THE HIGHER EDUC. CTR. FOR ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG
ABUSE AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION, PREVENTING VIOLENCE AND PROMOTING SAFETY IN
HIGHER EDUCATION SETTINGS (2004), available at http://www.higheredcenter.org/
pubs/violence.html.
276 [Vol. 55: p. 269
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long-term and short-term effects on the victim, the bully, and the by-
stander. Not only do victims of bullying suffer physical ramifications such
as headaches, stomach aches, weight loss, vomiting, and general poor
health, 4 0 but victims also suffer psychological effects such as depression,
loss of concentration, anxiety, and insomnia.4 ' These conditions impact
both academic achievement and the mental health of the victim.4 2 For
example, some studies find that victims of bullying perform below average
40. SeeJoseph A. Dake et al., The Nature and Extent of Bullying at School, 73 J.
ScH. HEALTH 173 (2003) (finding one study that concluded that victims were 4.6
times more likely and bullies 5.1 times more likely to experience psychosomatic
symptoms than students not involved in bullying; these symptoms included low
back pain, neck and shoulder pain, stomach ache, nervousness, irritation or tan-
trums, difficulty sleeping or waking, fatigue, and headache); R. Kaltiala-Heino et
al., Bullying at School-An Indicator of Adolescents at Risk for Mental Disorders, 23 J.
ADOLESCENCE 661 (2000) (illustrating that psychosomatic health issues, such as
poor appetite and anxiety, are also more common among victims and bully/vic-
tims); Ken Rigby, Peer Victimisation at School and the Health of Secondary School Stu-
dents, 69 BRIT. J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 95 (1999); Katrina Williams et al., Association of
Common Health Symptoms with Bullying in Primary School Children, 313 BlT. MED.J. 17
(1996) (finding that victimized children have been found to experience more fre-
quent stomach aches and headaches, and to be more likely to have troubles with
sleeping and bed wetting); D. Wolke et al., Bullying Involvement in Primary School and
Common Health Problems, 85 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 197 (2001), availa-
ble at http://adc.bmj.com/cgi/reprint/85/3/197.pdf (concluding that victims of
bullying and bully/victims are most likely to present physical health symptoms
such as sore throats, colds, and cough).
41. See Dake et al., supra note 40 (finding that (1) bullies are 2.8 to 4.3 times
more likely, victims four times more likely, and bully/victims 6.3 to 8.8 times more
likely to suffer from depressive symptoms than children not involved in bullying;
and (2) that bullies are four times more likely, victims 2.1 times more likely, and
bully/victims 2.5 times more likely to report having serious thoughts of suicide);
Kirsti Kumpulainen & Eila Rasanen, Children Involved in Bullying at Elementary School
Age: Their Psychiatric Symptoms and Deviance in Adolescence: An Epidemiological Sample,
24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLEcr 1567 (2000) (finding that children involved in bully-
ing at early age have been found to have more psychiatric symptoms in adoles-
cence than youth not involved in bullying); see also Addressing the Problem ofJuvenile
Bullying, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION FACT SHEET
(U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Wash., D.C.), June 2001, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/ojjdp/fs200127.pdf (describing that short-term psychological effects on
victims include increased feelings of loneliness, loss of self-esteem, and difficulties
making friends or maintaining relationships with classmates, and that victims may
also suffer humiliation, insecurity, and fear of attending school).
42. SeeJaanaJuvonen et al., Peer Harassment, Psychological Adjustment, and School
Functioning in Early Adolescence, 92 J. EDuc. PSYCHOL. 349 (2000) (examining grade
point averages of victimized students ages twelve to fifteen and finding them to be
lower than those of middle school students not involved in bullying, and noting
that bullying at school is also related to academic competence and school adjust-
ment, although research findings in this area do not always agree); David Schwartz
et al., The Emergence of Chronic Peer Victimization in Boys' Play Groups, 64 CHILD DEV.
1755 (1993) (noting that results are consistent with conclusion of study involving
U.S. children of nearly same age, which found that victims and bullies showed
lower academic competence, whereas study by Schwartz found that students who
were bully/victims had lower academic competence on same scale as bullies).
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in school and below students who are not subjected to bullying.4 3 Victims
may also try to avoid contact with the bully by changing their everyday
routines, avoiding the classroom or other school facilities, and in some
extremes, even withdrawing from college. In addition to withdrawal and
social isolation, victims may engage in negative or harmful conduct such as
acting more aggressively, turning to alcohol or drugs, or even committing
suicide. 4 4
Victims may also resort to physical violence in response to persistent
bullying. For example, reports from students indicated the Virginia Tech
gunman was bullied."5 Though these horrific incidents are relatively rare,
universities should not overlook the more common experience of being
bullied as a very real precursor to campus violence."6 Colleges that ignore
43. See Helen Mynard & Stephen Joseph, Bully/victim Problems and Their Associ-
ation with Eysenck's Personality Dimensions in 8 to 13 Year Olds, BuT. J. EDUC PSYCHOL.
1997 (1993) (finding that both bullies and victims did worse in school than chil-
dren not involved in bullying, and that victims were affected more than bullies);
Tonja R. Nansel et al., Relationships Between Bullying and Violence Among U.S. Youth,
157 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 348, 348 (2003), available at http:
//archpedi.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/157/4/348?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=
I0&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=Relationships+Between+Bullying+and+Violence+
Among+U.S.+Youth&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT (high-
lighting that although researchers did not find significant relationship between
academic achievement and bullying victimization, they did discover that bully/vic-
tims had poorer scholastic competence than students not involved in bullying, and
that bullies were 1.8 times more likely to be below average students as they were to
be good students).
44. See Marcel F. van der Wal et al., Psychosocial Health Among Young Victims and
Offenders of Direct and Indirect Bullying, 111 PEDIATRICS 1312 (2003) (indicating that
depression and thoughts of committing suicide are much more common among
boys and girls who have been bullied than among those who have not); see alo
Kaltiala-Heino et al., supra note 40 (commenting that frequent consumption of
alcohol and use of other controlled substances are more common among bullies
and bully/victims). But see Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among US
Youth: Prevalance and Association with Psychosocial Adjustment, 285 JAMA 2094 (2001)
(finding that alcohol use was positively associated with bullying others, but nega-
tively associated with being bullied, and finding that smoking was found to be
more common among both bullies and bully/victims).
45. See Posting of Amanda Phillips to The Depravity Scale, https://depravitys-
cale.org/blog/?p=19 (June 1, 2007, 20:11 EST). Experts caution against profiling
because there have been so few murder rampages on campuses, so it is difficult to
make any conclusions about likely perpetrators. See Sheldon F. Greenberg, Active
Shooters on College Campuses: Conflicting Advice, Roles of the Individual and First Re-
sponder, and the Need to Maintain Perspective, DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH
PREPAREDNESS, June 28, 2007, http://www.dmphp.org/cgi/content/full/1/
Supplement_1/S57#R9-17. However, studies about secondary school shootings do
support the proposition that bullying contributes to the perpetrator's violent be-
havior. For discussion of these studies, see infra note 46.
46. See U.S. SECRET SERV. NAT'L THREAT ASSESSMENT CTR., SAFE SCHOOL INITIA-
TIVE: AN INTERIM REPORT ON THE PREVENTION OF TARGETED VIOLENCE IN SCHOOL
(2000), available at http://cecp.air.org/download/ntac-ssi-report.pdf (noting
that bullying also seems to have been contributing factor in many mass school
shootings). The U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center examined
thirty-seven school shootings in the United States, and found that bullying played a
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bullying on campus help create an environment ripe for tragedy like the
one at Virginia Tech.
The victim is not the only one to experience negative effects from
bullying. Hazing research illustrates that some bullies suffer guilt, shame,
and discomfort after a bullying incident in which they act in a manner that
is inconsistent with their values.4 7 Moreover, bullies may also suffer de-
pression and suicidal ideation, though the cause of these symptoms may
be the result of having also been bullied. 48 Bullies are more likely to en-
gage in unlawful and/or violent behavior as children and later as adults
than their non-bullying peers.49 For example, a NICHD survey found that
"approximately 60 percent of boys who were classified by researchers as
bullies in grades six through nine were convicted of at least one crime by
the age of 24, compared to only 23 percent of the boys who were not
characterized as bullies or victims."5 0 Of those classified as bullies, 40%
had three or more convictions by age twenty-four, compared to 10% of
those who were neither victims nor bullies.5 1 Several other studies report
more frequent delinquent behavior among bullying offenders.5 2
The negative effects of bullying are also widely felt by bystanders.5 3
Bystanders witness the bullying and often for various reasons fail to inter-
vene.5 4 This failure causes different forms of distress for the individual
key role in two-thirds of these incidents. See id. A number of these attackers had
gone through harsh, long-term bullying, and their experiences seemed to be a
major motivation behind the attacks. See id.
47. See Denmark et al., supra note 35, at 35.
48. See van der Wal et al., supra note 44, at 1316.
49. See Nansel et al., supra note 43, at 348 (referencing significant quantity of
research examining link between bullying and violent behavior). In particular,
studies have found that bullying and being bullied are strongly associated with
involvement in physical fights and carrying weapons to school. See id. at 348-49
(explaining connection between bullying and future violent behavior). Bullying
can also be a marker for a variety of serious violent behaviors, including frequent
fighting, fighting-related injury, and weapon carrying. See id. (concluding based
on substantive research that bullying increases propensity for future violent activi-
ties and behaviors).
50. Fox ET AL., supra note 2, at 5 (citing research indicating correlation be-
tween youth bullying and later criminal activity or convictions); see also Ctr. for the
Study and Prevention of Violence, Olweus Bullying Prevention Program (BPP),
http://colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/modelprograms/BPP.html (noting that
children who bully are 37% more likely to commit offenses as adults) (last visited
May 17, 2010).
51. See Fox ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.
52. See, e.g., van der Wal et al., supra note 44, at 1316 (providing statistics
indicating that bullying offenders are more likely to engage in delinquent
behavior).
53. See Julian Knight, Bullied Workers Suffer "Battle Stress," BBC NEWS ONLINE,
Aug. 17, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3563450.stm (noting that
witnesses of bullying often suffer similar mental problems to those bullied). For
further discussion of the effects of bullying on bystanders, see infra note 55 and
accompanying text.
54. Joel Epstein, Breaking the Code of Silence: Bystanders to Campus Violence and
the Law of College and University Safety, 32 STETSON L. REv. 91 (2002).
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who witnesses bullying, including guilt for not stopping it, fear of being a
future victim or losing social influence, and anger and frustration towards
the aggressor.55
These negative effects of feeling uncomfortable, helpless, or de-
graded do not disappear with age; even adults suffer both physically and
psychologically when bullied.5 6 Some experts have compared the post-
traumatic stress felt by bullied workers to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
symptoms experienced by soldiers.5 7 These findings make addressing bul-
lying in college all the more important and refute arguments that bullying
only occurs among, or exclusively impacts, children.
III. LEGAL THEORIES
Because no independent cause of action exists for bullying, students
must rely on other grounds to challenge bullying.58 Plaintiffs can file har-
assment claims under federal statutes; however, such claims require a high
standard of proof, which makes it very difficult for bullying victims to re-
cover.59 Finding colleges and universities liable for peer harassment is
more challenging than similar actions against elementary and secondary
schools because of the reduced control over students in the university set-
ting. Historically, tort actions based on bullying conduct have been unsuc-
55. See Jennifer L. Martin, Gendered Violence on Campus: Unpacking Bullying,Harassment, and Stalking, in UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING CAMPUS VIOLENCE,
supra note 35, at 3, 5; see also School Violence: Prevalence, Fears, and Prevention, ISSUE
PAPER (RAND Education, Santa Monica, Cal.), 2001, available at, http://
www.rand.org/pubs/issue-papers/IP219/index2.html (recognizing prevalence of
bullying and suggesting school programs, counseling, and mediation, among
other recommendations, to help alleviate bullying in schools).
56. See Knight, supra note 53 (identifying nightmares, "susceptibility to illness,
heart disease and alcoholism" among physical and psychological conditions suf-
fered by bullying victims and noting that bullied employees average seven more
sick days per year than their non-bullied coworkers).
57. See id. (presenting conclusions of research indicating that workplace bully-
ing victims exhibit symptoms associated with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder). Spe-
cifically, the author cited the research of Dr. Noreen Tehrani, who conducted a
study of 165 professionals in the "caring sector" and found that one in five exhib-
ited symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. See id. (identifying research find-
ings of Dr. Tehrani). In particular, these symptoms included "hyper arousal, a
feeling of constant anxiety and over-vigilance; avoidance of anything to do with the
traumatizing event; and re-experiencing, in which subjects suffer flashbacks or ob-
sessive thoughts concerning the trauma." See id. (providing examples of three
main signs of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder).
58. See Kathleen Conn, Bullying in K-12 Public Schools: Searching for Solutions,
COMMONWEALTH EDUCATION POLICY INSTITUTE, Winter 2006, at 4, available at http:
//www.cepionline.org/pdf/Policy%20Briefs/Kathleen%2OConn-Bullying%20
VCU%20PolicyPaper%202-11-06.pdf (noting that bullying victims often rely on
harassment actions because no current state anti-bulling statute provides private
cause of action and anti-bullying statutes providing enforcement mechanisms gen-
erally leave enforcement "to the discretion of local Boards").
59. See id. at 4-5 (noting that many students and parents attempt to seek re-
dress via harassment suits but explaining that high standards of proof imposed on
plaintiffs render recovery difficult).
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cessful against colleges because of courts' reluctance to impose any special
duties on schools for students' safety. 60
Plaintiffs have increasingly, and with some measure of success, pur-
sued tort theories with lower standards of proof. For example, several
claimants have asserted claims under state-based civil rights statutes to suc-
cessfully recover against K-12 schools for their failure to stop extreme bul-
lying.6 1 Universities and colleges should be prepared for such suits to be
filed against them and appreciate the lower standard a plaintiff needs to
satisfy for recovery. This section provides a brief overview of the legal the-
ories plaintiffs have applied in pursuing their bullying claims.
A. Legal Theories Based on Protected Class Membership
1. Title IX
a. Background to Title IX
In 1972, Congress passed Title IX primarily to help women gain ac-
cess to the same educational opportunities as their male counterparts.6 2
Congress debated whether Title IX was actually needed or, instead, if Con-
gress could just add the word "sex" to existing Title VI prohibitions against
racial discrimination.6 3 Title IX's proponents were ultimately victorious
and Title IX was passed, providing that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."6 4
At the time of Title IX's passage, there was uncertainty as to whether
it was intended to cover sexual harassment.6 5 In fact, it was not until the
1990s that the Supreme Court heard cases pertaining to sexual harassment
and Title IX. One of the first of these cases, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
SchoolDistict,66 involved the alleged sexual harassment of an eighth-grader
60. See Marshall v. Cortland Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 697 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
61. For a discussion of the state-based civil rights statutes, see infra notes 166-
75 and accompanying text.
62. See Kelly Titus, Students, Beware: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, 60 LA. L. REv. 321, 327 (1999) (reviewing legislative history of Title IX and
citing House Subcommittee on Education and Labor hearings where debate cen-
tered on providing women greater access to higher education).
63. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 663 (1999); see also
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1999) (exempting educational facilities from Title VII's
prohibition of sex discrimination).
64. See id. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a).
65. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 663-64 (explaining that when Title IX was passed,
the "concept of 'sexual harassment' as gender discrimination had not been recog-
nized or considered by the courts" and thus concluding that "there is no basis to
think that Congress contemplated liability for a school's failure to remedy discrimi-
natory acts by students or that the States would believe the statute imposed on
them a clear obligation to do so").
66. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
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by her teacher.67 The student claimed that the teacher made sexually sug-
gestive comments to her and other female students.6 8 The teacher also
fondled the student's breasts and ultimately engaged in sexual intercourse
with her.69
The Court in Gebser set out a two-part standard for holding schools
liable under Title IX.70 First, an official with authority to address the
problem must have actual notice of the harassment.7 1 Second, the official
must fail to respond adequately.7 2 The Court's interpretation of its ade-
67. See id. at 278-79 (describing facts and procedural posture of case). Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff student and her mother filed Title IX, § 1983, and state negli-
gence claims against the school district, as well as state law claims against the
teacher individually. See id. (describing procedural posture of case).
68. See id. at 277-78 (describing facts of case).
69. See id. at 278 (describing facts of case). According to the record, the
teacher commenced a sexual relationship with the plaintiff in the spring of her
freshman year in high school when he visited her house to give her a book, and
kissed and fondled her. See id. The plaintiff and teacher had sexual intercourse
numerous times during the school year and continued their relationship until Jan-
uary 1993, when the teacher was arrested after a police officer discovered them
engaged in sexual intercourse. See id. Throughout the course of their relation-
ship, the plaintiff did not report the relationship to school officials because "while
she realized [the teacher's] conduct was improper, she was uncertain how to react
and she wanted to continue having him as a teacher." See id.
70. See id. at 292 (holding that until Congress directly addresses issue of
school district liability for sexual harassment claims, "actual notice" and "deliber-
ate indifference" are required for plaintiff recovery). The Court recognized that
because Title IX provides a "judicially implied" rather than an expressed right to
private action, "there is no legislative expression of the scope of available remedies,
including when it is appropriate to award monetary damages." Id. at 283-84. Con-
sequently, in the absence of additional guidance from Congress, the Court devel-
oped a two-part standard as a "sensible remedial scheme that best comports with
the statute." Id. at 284.
71. See id. at 285-88 (holding plaintiffs must show that defendant school dis-
trict had "actual notice" of sexual harassment in Title IX claim). The plaintiffs
argued that the Court should employ "constructive notice" or "respondeat supe-
rior" standards rather than impose a requirement of "actual notice." See id. at 282-
83. Rejecting these standards, the Court noted that both would provide for "un-
limited recovery of damages under Title IX where Congress has not spoken on the
subject of either the right or the remedy." Id. at 286 (evaluating plaintiff's argu-
ments against legislative history of Title IX). Moreover, the Court stipulated that
where Congress "attaches conditions to the award of federal funds under its spend-
ing power"-as it did in Title IX-"ensuring 'that the receiving entity of federal
funds [had] notice'" of liability for monetary damages is a "central concern." Id. at
287 (examining legislative history of Title IX and Court precedent in spending
clause cases) (internal citations omitted). Finally, the Court concluded that Con-
gress did not envision vicarious liability or constructive notice as the applicable
standards based on its stipulation that Title IX funding can only be suspended or
terminated through enforcement proceedings "until it 'has advised the appropri-
ate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement.'" Id. at 288.
In view of these considerations, the Court held that actual notice was the appropri-
ate standard in assessing liability. See id. at 285-88 (concluding based on legislative
history that Congress envisioned actual notice as appropriate standard).
72. See id. at 290 (noting that Title IX's "express remedial scheme" provides
"an opportunity to rectify the violation" and concluding that congressional ap-
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quacy requirement was arguably generous for school defendants in that
they could meet the standard without actually stopping the harassment.
Specifically, the Court concluded that liability based on this standard lies
only upon a showing that the school official acted with "deliberate indif-
ference" or made an official decision not to correct the violation." Apply-
ing this standard to the facts of Gebser, school officials were aware of the
teacher's sexually inappropriate comments to female students and warned
him to watch his classroom comments, but did not have actual notice of
the teacher's sexual acts with the plaintiff.7 4 Consequently, based on this
lack of actual notice, the Court refused to find the school liable under
Title IX for sexual harassment.7 5
b. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education7 6
In 1999, the Court once again heard a case involving Title IX and
sexual harassment issues.7 7 Instead of teacher-on-student sexual harass-
ment, the sexual harassment in Davis was peer-on-peer. The plaintiff sued
the school district, not for the other student's actions, but for the school's
inaction in allowing the known harassment to continue against the stu-
dent.7 8 During the 1999 school year, Davis, a fifth-grade girl, endured
proval of "corrective action" demands that plaintiff also show school district's inad-
equate response to actual notice).
73. See id. (concluding that Title IX's "administrative enforcement scheme"
requires imposition of "deliberate indifference" standard because the "scheme pre-
supposes that an official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action
to bring the recipient into compliance" or officially decides "not to remedy the
violation"). See id. (examining Title IX's "administrative enforcement scheme" to
identify appropriate "adequacy" interpretation).
74. See id. at 278 (noting Gesber failed to report the sexual relationship to
administrators). Although complaints were made regarding the teacher's com-
ments, no complaints were made about the relationship. See id. (describing facts of
case).
75. See id. at 291 (noting that plaintiffs conceded school did not have actual
notice and holding that because teacher's offensive comments to other students
were "plainly insufficient to alert the principal to the possibility that [the teacher]
was involved in a sexual relationship with a student," Title IX liability standards
were not met).
76. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
77. See id. at 632-33 (describing nature of "student-on-student" Title IX sexual
harassment suit and defining question presented as "whether a private damages
action may lie against the school board in cases of student-on-student
harassment").
78. See id. at 635-36 (describing facts and procedural posture of case). The
plaintiff, the harassed student's mother, filed suit against the school Board, the
district superintendent, and the school principal based on their alleged failure to
discipline the harassing student in violation of Title IX. See id. at 635 (describing
facts and procedural posture of case). Specifically, the complaint alleged that
"'the persistent sexual advances and harassment . . . interfered with [the plain-
tiffs] ability to attend school and perform her studies and activities,' and that 'the
deliberate indifference by Defendants to the unwelcomed sexual advances ... cre-
ated an intimidating, hostile, offensive and abusive school environment'" that vio-
lated Title IX. Id. at 636.
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continual verbal and physical harassment by one of her classmates. The
male classmate attempted to touch her genital area and breasts, rubbed
against her in a sexually suggestive way, and persistently made harassing
comments to her such as "I want to feel your boobs" and "I want to get in
bed with you."7 9 Even though Davis and her mother complained to
school officials, the officials took no action to stop or deter the harass-
ment.8 0 Rather, the harassment did not stop until the offending classmate
was charged with, and plead guilty to, sexual battery.8 '
The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's holding that schools could
not be liable for peer-on-peer harassment, holding instead that a recipient
of federal funds can be liable for its own misconduct. 82 To this end, the
Court held that for a school-as a recipient of federal funds-to be liable
under Title IX, the school must "'exclud[e] [persons] from participation
in, . . . den[y] [persons] the benefits of, or . . . subjec[t] [persons] to
discrimination under its 'programs or activities.'" 83 Moreover, in addition
to being subject to liability for its own action, the Court concluded that a
school can be liable where its "deliberate indifference 'subjects' its stu-
dents to harassment" and the harassment occurs in a "context subject to
the school district's control."8 4 Here, the Court held that because the
79. See id. at 633-34 (describing facts of case).
80. See id. (describing facts of case). According to the record, from December
1992 until May of 1993 the student verbally and physically sexually harassed Davis.
See id. at 634. After each incident, Davis reported the harassing student's conduct
to her teachers, and her mother contacted the teachers to "follow up." See id.
Moreover, Davis's mother met with the school principal in mid-May to inquire as
to what disciplinary was being taken to prevent the student from further harassing
her daughter. See id. In response to her inquiry, the principal indicated "I guess
I'll have to threaten him a little bit harder." See id.
81. See id. (describing facts of case).
82. See id. at 633 (describing procedural posture of case).
83. Id. at 640-41 (rejecting contention that government's enforcement power
under Title IX extends to liability for third parties' actions and holding that school
liability requires school itself acted in violation of Title XI). Here, the Court devel-
oped its requirement that the school itself must act to cause the alleged injury by
employing the language of Title IX, which states, "no person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. at 638 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)).
84. Id. at 644-45 (holding that school liability was not restricted to harassment
perpetrated by school and expanding school liability to encompass situations
where deliberate indifference or inaction contributed to harassment). In particu-
lar, the Court explained:
[I]f a funding recipient does not engage in harassment directly, it may
not be liable for damages unless its deliberate indifference "subjects" its
students to harassment. That is, the deliberate indifference must, at a
minimum, "cause [students] to undergo" harassment or "make them lia-
ble or vulnerable" to it. Moreover, because the harassment must occur
"under" "the operations of" a funding recipient, the harassment must
take place in a context subject to the school district's control.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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harassing student's actions occurred during school hours and on school
property, the misconduct was within the school's control.8 5
After determining that a private remedy is available under Title IX
where the school is indifferent to peer-on-peer harassment, the Court de-
fined sexual discrimination in the same fashion as Title VII.8 6 Prior Title
VII cases included sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.8 7
Under Title VII, employers can be liable for both quid pro quo sexual
harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment.8 8 Adopting this
approach for Title IX, the Court concluded that a school district could be
liable for hostile environment sexual harassment when the harassing stu-
dent's behavior is so "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" as to de-
prive the victim of the educational opportunities provided by the school.8 9
Unlike Title VII, which uses agency principles, Title IX liability only at-
taches if the school has actual knowledge of the harassment and acts with
deliberate indifference. 90 In remanding the case to the district court for
further proceedings, the Court concluded that the school may have cre-
ated a hostile environment for the plaintiff by failing to take disciplinary
actions against the harassing student.9 '
c. Applying Davis's Ill-Defined Standard
Just what constitutes "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive,"
however, has been the subject of much discussion. Justice Kennedy's dis-
sent in Davis anticipated that such a nebulous standard would result in
85. See id. at 645 (applying requirement that "the harassment must occur
'under' 'the operations of a funding recipient" to facts of instant case).
86. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has defined sexual harass-
ment under Title VII, see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
87. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (noting that
1990 EEOC Guidelines included "sexual harassment" as "sexual discrimination"
prohibited by Title VII). Specifically, the Court explained that "while [the Guide-
lines are] not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [they] do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and liti-
gants may properly resort for guidance," and affirmed that the "EEOC Guidelines
fully support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic injury can violate
Title VII." Id.
88. See id. at 65-66 (defining scope of employer liability for sexual harassment
claims under Title VII); see also Titus, supra note 62, at 324-25 (explaining that
Court defined quid pro quo sexual harassment as "advances or requests for sexual
favors in return for advancements or other employment decisions," and "hostile
environment" as "an environment that interferes with performance").
89. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (determining that sexual harassment constitutes
"'discrimination' in the school context under Title IX" and thus concluding that
sexual harassment when sufficiently severe rises "to the level of discrimination ac-
tionable under the statute").
90. See id. at 643 (stipulating that per Gesber, "actual notice" and "deliberate
indifference" are also required to avoid subjecting Title IX recipients to liability for
employee independent actions).
91. See id. at 649 (concluding based on record that plaintiff may be able to
show Davis was subjected "to discrimination by failing to respond in any way over a
period of five months of complaints").
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widespread problems for schools. 9 2 In an effort to help define factors con-
stituting a "hostile environment," the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) pub-
lishes a guide to aid schools in determining their responsibilities for peer-
on-peer sexual harassment.9 3 The OCR guide instructs that it is "the total-
ity of the circumstances" in which the behavior occurs that is critical in
determining whether a hostile environment exists.94 Among the factors
that should be considered in this totality of the circumstances assessment
are: "the degree to which the conduct affected one or more students' edu-
cation"; "the type, frequency, and duration of the conduct"; "the identity
of and relationship between the alleged harasser and the subject or sub-
jects of the harassment"; "the number of individuals involved"; "the age
and sex of the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of the harass-
ment"; "the size of the school, location of the incidents, and context in
which they occurred"; and "other incidents at the school."9 5 These guide-
lines, although helpful, illustrate the problem schools and courts face with
Title IX lawsuits. Specifically, these factors must be examined on a case-by-
case basis and what may qualify as a hostile environment at one school may
not be actionable at another.96 Unfortunately, a bright line test in this
area of law is impractical.
d. Application to College Students
Although Gebser and Davis involved elementary and secondary stu-
dents, the principles established in these decisions apply to college stu-
dents as well.9 7 Specifically, the elements set forth in Gebser and Davis are
92. See id. at 654-85 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (expressing concern with major-
ity's "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" standard). In particular, the dis-
sent, comprised of Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Thomas, explained that, "[t]he majority's opinion purports to be narrow,
but the limiting principles it proposes are illusory. The fence the Court has built is
made of little sticks, and it cannot contain the avalanche of liability now set in
motion." Id. at 657 (arguing that majority's holding expands school liability in
harassment cases beyond that envisioned by Congress).
93. See Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't. of Educ., Sexual Harassment Gui-
dance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third
Parties (Mar. 13, 1997), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar
01.html (containing sexual harassment guidelines published by Office for Civil
Rights that examines, among other things, situations for which schools may be
found liable for hostile environment harassment claims).
94. See id. (articulating that "totality of the circumstances" assessment is neces-
sary in determining whether "harassment occurred").
95. See id. (stipulating that assessment of hostile environment setting requires
consideration of subjective and objective elements, and examining factors perti-
nent to thorough assessment) (internal citations omitted).
96. See id.
97. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 649 (noting that Davis standard is "sufficiently flexi-
ble" to allow both grade schools and universities to exercise appropriate "degree of
control over its students"); see also Martha McCarthy & Suzanne Eckes, Sexual Har-
assment, in CONTEMPORARY IssuEs IN HIGHER EDUCATION LAw 277, 282 (Joseph
Beckman & David Dagley ed., 2005) (explaining that standards enunciated in
Gebser and Davis apply to higher education students).
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all required in the college setting: (1) school control; (2) actual knowl-
edge; (3) deliberate indifference; (4) severe, pervasive, and objectively of-
fensive harassment; and (5) occurrence of the harassment under an
educational program or facility. However, these elements may be even
more formidable barriers for college students than for K-12 students.9 8
i. Control
Peer harassment claims will be successful only when the school "exer-
cises substantial control over both harasser and the context in which the
known harassment occurs."99 Obviously, elementary and secondary
schools have more control over their students than do colleges and univer-
sities. 00 As a result, peer harassment-based claims have not been particu-
larly common among higher education students.1 01 That is not to say that
courts never find factual situations in which the college can exercise con-
trol. For example, in Williams v. Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia,102 the Eleventh Circuit found that a University of Georgia student
alleged facts sufficient to withstand the defendants' motion to dismiss her
Title IX claim based on student-on-student sexual harassment. 0 3 In Wil-
liams, the plaintiff had consensual sex with Tony Cole, a UGA basketball
player in his dorm room. 04 Cole did not tell the plaintiff, however, that a
football player was in his closet during the encounter and that the two had
previously agreed that the football player would sexually assault the plain-
tiff after she and Cole finished having sex.10 5 While the football player
sexually assaulted and attempted to rape the plaintiff, Cole also called
other male students to tell them they were gang raping the plaintiff and
watched as one of these individuals entered his room and raped her.' 06 In
her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that university officials knew Cole had
98. For a discussion of how the Gesber and Davis Title IX liability requirements
apply in the college setting, see infra notes 99-138 and accompanying text.
99. Davis, 526 U.S. at 668 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (explaining level of school
control required in majority opinion for school liability).
100. See McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 97, at 288 (noting that universities ex-
ercise less control over student population than at K-12 levels).
101. See id. (explaining that because Davis required "control" as element of
school liability and because universities exercise less control over their student
body, fewer harassment claims result at higher education level).
102. 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007).
103. See id. at 1290-91 (describing facts and procedural posture of case).
104. See id. at 1288 (describing facts of case). The record indicated that Cole
called the plaintiff around 9:00 p.m. on January 14, 2002 and invited her to come
to his room in the student-athletes dormitory. See id. Cole and the plaintiff en-
gaged in consensual sex shortly after she arrived to his room. See id.
105. See id. (describing facts of case). Cole went to the bathroom after having
sex with the plaintiff. See id. When Cole exited the room, the football player
"emerged from the closet naked" and sexually assaulted and attempted to rape the
plaintiff. See id.
106. See id. (describing facts of case). According to the record, Cole en-
couraged the individual who raped the plaintiff to do so. See id.
2872010]
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a history of sexual abuse charges, but still recruited him to the university
and failed to inform him of the school's sexual harassment policies.1 07
Upholding the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, the
Eleventh Circuit specifically considered the issue of school control, stating:
[b]y placing Cole in a student dormitory and failing to supervise
him in any way or to inform him of their expectations of him
under the applicable sexual harassment policy, UGA and UGAA
substantially increased the risk faced by female students at UGA
.... Even though "[a] university might not .. . be expected to
exercise the same degree of control over its students that a grade
school would enjoy," UGA and UGAA exercised almost no con-
trol over Cole, even though they knew about his past sexual
misconduct.108
ii. Actual Knowledge
Establishing that the school exercised control, however, presents only
one of many obstacles a plaintiff must overcome. The levels of conduct
necessary to satisfy the elements of peer harassment claims under Title IX
remain formidable barriers preventing the success of most claims. Among
these necessary elements, proving a university has actual notice of prior
harassment remains very difficult. Normally, prior sexual harassment by a
different student against a different victim does not satisfy the known acts
requirement. 109 In at least one case, however, a federal appellate court
allowed the plaintiff to argue that showing knowledge of policies or prac-
tices that create a risk of possible harassment could fulfill the actual knowl-
edge requirement. 110 Specifically, in Simpson v. University of Colorado
107. See id. at 1292-93 (describing procedural posture of case).
108. Id. at 1296-97 (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 649 (1999)).
109. See, e.g., Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 750-51 (8th Cir. 2003) (not-
ing that plaintiffs complaint included claim that school had actual knowledge
based on sexual abuses allegedly complained of by other female students, but con-
cluding that plaintiff "failed to adduce sufficient evidence that would allow a rea-
sonable jury to find either [that the school] had actual knowledge of the sexual
abuse complained of or was deliberately indifferent to complaints of sexual vio-
lence brought by female students").
110. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir.
2007) (holding that actual notice requirement was satisfied where school had
knowledge of past sexual assaults that occurred in connection with high-school
athlete recruitment visits and school failed to remedy recruitment program). In
particular, the court concluded that a Title IX funding recipient can be found in
violation of the statute where "the violation is caused by official policy, which may
be a policy of deliberate indifference to providing adequate training or guidance
that is obviously necessary for implementation of a specific program or policy of
the recipient." Id. (applying actual notice requirement to facts of case). In Simp-
son, the record established:
(1) that [the school] had an official policy of showing high-school foot-
ball recruits a "good time" on their visits to the . .. campus, (2) that the
288 [Vol. 55: p. 269
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Boulder,11' the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judg-
ment in favor of the university because the Tenth Circuit found that an
issue of fact existed as to whether the university was on notice as to a pat-
tern of sexual assault and harassment in the football program and whether
the university acted with deliberate indifference to the ongoing culture of
hostility and abuse of women. 112 In Simpson, football recruits raped a wo-
man during one of their college visits. 1 1 3 The woman argued that the
university's ineffective or non-existent recruiting policies exposed female
students and other women to severe sexual harassment and possible as-
saults.11 4 The case ultimately settled for 2.5 million dollars.11 5
iii. Deliberate Indifference
Title IX plaintiffs must also show that the institution remained delib-
erately indifferent to acts of harassment. No particular response is re-
quired and liability attaches only when an institution's response is "clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances."116 Universities are
not required to expel or suspend an alleged harasser and courts have
found no deliberate indifference where administration officials met with
the alleged harasser to discuss appropriate behavior, notified faculty mem-
bers, and took measures to prevent encounters between the students,
while allowing the harassing student to remain on campus.1 17
alleged sexual assaults were caused by [the school's] failure to provide
adequate supervision and guidance to player-hosts chosen to show the
football recruits a "good time," and (3) that the likelihood of such mis-
conduct was so obvious that [the school's] failure was the result of delib-
erate indifference.
Id. at 1172.
111. 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
112. See id. at 1180-85.
113. See id. at 1180 (describing facts of case).
114. See id. at 1173 (describing nature of plaintiff's Title IX claims as alleging
that school "knew of the risk of sexual harassment of female ... students in con-
nection with [the school's] football recruiting program," yet failed to remedy pro-
gram to prevent further harassment).
115. See American Civil Liberties Union, Simpson v. University of Colorado
(Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/simpson-v-university-colo-
rado (describing settlement of case following Tenth Circuit opinion).
116. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (explain-
ing that school administrators retain "the flexibility they require" unless their ac-
tion or lack of action "is clearly unreasonable," and further stating that "clearly
unreasonable" standard does not require remedying "peer harassment" or "'en-
sur[ing] that .. . students conform their conduct to' certain rules").
117. See, e.g., Cubie v. Bryan Career Coll., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1203 (D. Kan.
2003) (noting that expulsion of harassing student was not required for school to
"show it reacted reasonably," and explaining that "clearly unreasonable" standard
was imposed to ensure courts "will continue to refrain from 'second-guessing"'
school disciplinary judgments); see also Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733,
751-52 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding school administrators acted reasonably and without
"deliberate indifference" where officials met to discuss harassment and arranged
counseling session with harasser despite deciding not to remove harassing individ-
2892010]
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In contrast, evidence that might support a claim of deliberate indiffer-
ence could include a failure to investigate, the absence of a sexual harass-
ment policy, or the failure to discipline.11 8 For example, in Williams, the
plaintiff, after being gang raped by several university athletes, brought a
Title IX action alleging that the president, athletic director, and coaches
knew about one of the athlete's past sexual misconduct at several other
schools when they recruited him.1 19 The Eleventh Circuit held that this
knowledge, combined with the university's decision to wait eight months
before conducting a disciplinary hearing, indicated a deliberate indiffer-
ence sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 120
iv. Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive Harassment
Even assuming the university has notice, the harassment must still be
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive for a school to be liable under
Title IX.12 1 This standard, however, is difficult for plaintiffs to meet in
practice. In a recent case, the District of Kansas struck down a student's
Title IX claim, holding that the harassment the student complained of was
not sufficiently severe or pervasive when it involved four incidents of un-
wanted touching by a male classmate. 12 2 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in
ual); Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 745 (8th Cir. 2003) (determining that
school's decision not to sanction fraternity where sexual assault occurred was not
"clearly unreasonable" where administration officials met personally with chapter
president, wrote to fraternity's national president explaining seriousness of of-
fense, and sponsored educational program for fraternity members); Doe v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding school did not act
with "deliberate indifference" where school officials explained seriousness of al-
leged sexual harassment offense to harasser and instructed him not "repeat the
behavior that made the child accuse him of abuse").
118. See Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 261-63 (6th
Cir. 2000) (surveying relevant case law including Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, Murrell v. School District No. 1, and Willis v. Brown University to identify
factors that may render schools liable based on "deliberate indifference").
119. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282,
1292-93 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing district court's finding that school knew of ath-
lete's sexual misconduct when athlete was recruited, and holding that plaintiffs
Title IX claims alleging "actual notice" should not have been dismissed because
such knowledge can constitute actual notice).
120. See id. at 1296-97 (holding that school's knowledge of athlete's past sex-
ual misconduct, failure to supervise athlete in dormitory or inform him of sexual
harassment policy, and significant delay in conducting disciplinary hearing
amounted to facts sufficient to constitute Title IX claim and possible showing of
"deliberate indifference").
121. For a discussion of the "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" stan-
dard, as well as a review of the case in which the standard was adopted, see supra
notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
122. See Cubie, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-04 (analyzing scope of "severe, perva-
sive, and objectively offensive" standard and concluding that alleged conduct did
not create a "hostile environment" as required for Title IX actions). In particular,
the court noted that the severe and pervasive standard demands that the conduct
"must be so extreme that it interfered with or altered the conditions of [the plain-
tiff's] school environment, so that she was denied access to an educational oppor-
290
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Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology 23 refused to find incidents of
inappropriate touching-one on the shoulder and one on the breast-to
be severe.124 In actuality there were twelve incidents of harassment, but
the court refused to consider them because the student reported only
two.125
v. Educational Program or Activity
Finally, Title IX claims require that the harassment occur under an
educational program or activity and have the "systemic effect" of depriving
plaintiffs of access to educational opportunities.' 2 6 This requirement may
be more heavily disputed in a university setting than in elementary or sec-
ondary schools because most of the alleged harassment in the latter set-
ting occurs "during the school hours and on school grounds."1 2 7 The
issue becomes more complicated when the alleged harassment occurs
outside of the classroom or off of campus.128 The university's liability in
these cases may turn on the extent to which the off-campus incidents cre-
ate a hostile environment within the institution.129
tunity or benefit." Id. at 1204. Here, the court held that four incidents of
touching-three times on the back or neck and once on the thigh-for a few
seconds, failed to establish a hostile environment. See id. at 1203 (describing facts
of case).
123. No. 98-3561, 1999 WL 528169, at *1-2 (7th Cir. July 21, 1999).
124. See id. at *1 (concluding that harassment is characterized as "severe" if it
is "repeated" and has "a 'systemic effect'" on harassed student). With respect to
the Title IX claim requirement that the harassment "can be said to deprive the
victim of access to the educational opportunities and benefits provided by the
school," the plaintiff alleged that her complaint met this standard because "she
received 'unfair grades' in retaliation for her complaints." See id. at *1-2 (detailing
Title IX claim requirements and describing facts of case). The court rejected the
plaintiff's assertion, based on evidence that her grades dropped on a variety of
legitimate grounds, including grammar mistakes. See id. at *2 (describing facts of
case).
125. See id. at *1 (affirming requirement of "actual notice" to school in Title
IX claims and therefore concluding that incidents of harassment must be
reported).
126. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652-53 (1999)
(holding that school must have control over student when harassment occurs and
harassment must prove severe enough to cause "systemic effect" reducing equal
educational rights).
127. See id. at 646 (explaining that elementary and secondary schools are
often able to exercise greater control over situations in which harassment occurs).
128. See, e.g., Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
university not liable where assault occurred at off-campus house and was not part
of educational program).
129. See Candrell v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (articulating that Title IX liability is possible where off-campus
harassment caused plaintiff to fear being on campus). To this end, the court spe-
cifically noted that "[c]ourts frequently have upheld sexual harassment claims
under Title IX where some or all of the alleged misconduct occurred off campus"
but "the off campus incidents had created a hostile environment in the institu-
tion." Id.
2010] 291
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vi. Overall Application to College Students
Analyzing these cases as a whole, it appears that courts are still reluc-
tant to find universities and colleges liable under Title IX for peer harass-
ment unless plaintiffs can show a pervasive campus culture of harassment
that is ignored by campus officials. Despite this general reluctance, courts
are particularly willing to find universities and colleges liable for subsets of
students, such as athletes, whom they have or should have more control
over than other college students.1 3 0
Extending this liability to students who are not part of such a subset
presents a more difficult challenge-though not impossible. For example,
in an interesting case not involving athletes, the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut allowed a Title IX claim to go for-
ward against Yale University for inadequately responding to a female stu-
dent's complaints regarding an alleged incident of sexual assault by
another student. 1 3 1 Unlike other Title IX cases, the issue in this case did
not concern liability for the alleged rape itself because the university did
not receive notice of the harassing behavior until after it had occurred.13 2
Instead, the plaintiff complained that Yale acted with deliberate indiffer-
ence when it failed to provide her with academic and residential accom-
modations following the rape and up until the time the grievance
procedures were completed.' 3 3
The court held that the plaintiff raised an issue of material fact with
respect to the severity of the harassment based on its conclusion that a
reasonable jury "could conclude that further encounters, of any sort, be-
tween a rape victim and her attacker could create an environment suffi-
ciently hostile to deprive the victim of access to educational opportunities
provided by a university." 3 4 The court questioned whether the minimal
efforts made by Yale to protect the plaintiff from further harassment vio-
lated Title IX.13 5 The critical question left for the District Court to resolve
in assessing this question was whether Yale's actions caused the student to
130. For a discussion of cases in which federal appellate courts have found
schools liable for harassment of other students by student athletes, see supra notes
102-08, 110-14, and accompanying text.
131. See Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. Civ.A. 3:01-CV-1591, 2003 WL 1563424, at *4
(D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003) (holding plaintiffs Title IX complaint should not be
dismissed where facts indicate university failed to respond to plaintiffs needs after
being harassed by fellow student).
132. See id. at *1-2 (describing facts and procedural posture of case).
133. See id. (describing facts and procedural posture of case).
134. Id. at *3 (concluding that possibility of "further encounters" between
plaintiff and attacker could create hostile environment for plaintiff on campus,
and holding that university's awareness of this fact could potentially constitute "ac-
tual notice" and satisfy first Title IX requirement in Davis).
135. See id. at *5 (explaining that finding should be made regarding whether
university's minimal actions constituted "clear unreasonable [ness]").
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"undergo harassment or make her vulnerable to it."1 3 6 Here, the plaintiff
requested academic and residential accommodations because of the "dis-
comfort and fear that she would feel if she encountered" her
perpetrator.1 37
The discomfort and fear experienced by rape victims also exists, per-
haps to a lesser degree, in victims of bullies.' 3 8 Plaintiffs may argue, there-
fore, that this case be expanded to find liability when universities and
colleges make minimal efforts to protect against future bullying after the
bullying has been investigated and verified by the administration. Courts
and college administrators need to understand the substantial and detri-
mental effects that severe, pervasive bullying can have in depriving stu-
dents of educational opportunities.
2. Section 1983 Suits
Because Title IX allows suits only against school districts, students may
also want to bring Section 19831' actions against individuals based on
Title IX, due process, or equal protection violations. 140 During the 2008-
2009 term, the Supreme Court settled a longstanding circuit split by decid-
ing that Title IX is not the sole remedy for sex discrimination in
schools.141 Moreover, the Court concluded that Title IX does not pre-
empt Section 1983 constitutional and statutory claims.14 2 Even if the Sec-
tion 1983 claims are procedurally allowed to survive, however, plaintiffs
traditionally fare no better with Section 1983 due process actions than
with Title IX actions because of enormous substantive barriers implicit in
each.' 4 3 Specifically, because the Due Process Clause does not normally
136. Id. at *4 (noting that university's action or lack of action is "actionable"
under Title IX if school's "deliberate indifference" caused or created environment
of harassment).
137. Id.
138. See Stig Berge Matthiesen & Stale Einarsen, Psychiatric Distress and Symp-
toms ofPTSD Among Victims of Bullying at Work, 32 BRIT. J. GUIDANCE & COUNSELLING
334, 348 (2004), available at http://www.student.uib.no/People/pspsm/
documents/Bullying-PTSD-2004-Matthiesen-Einarsen.pdf.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
140. See Conn, supra note 58, at 5 (surveying remedies available to harassed
and/or bullied students).
141. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 792 (2009) (de-
fining question presented as whether Title XI precludes action under § 1983 and
concluding that it does not).
142. See id. at 796 (holding that "comparison of the substantive rights and
protections guaranteed under Title IX and under the Equal Protection Clause
lends . .. support to the conclusion that Congress did not intend Title IX to pre-
clude" or supersede § 1983 claims).
143. See Paul M. Secunda, At The Crossroads of Title IX and a New "IDEA": Why
Bullying Need Not Be "A Normal Part of Growing Up" for Special Education Children, 12
DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2005) (describing current legal remedies as "woe-
fully inadequate" for harassment victims due to high burdens required in each).
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require states to protect their citizens,14 4 students generally need to qual-
ify for one of two exceptions: (1) the school has a special relationship with
the student, or (2) the school created the danger.145
Fitting within the special relationship or state created danger excep-
tions remains difficult for plaintiffs. 146 For example, the Eastern District
of Virginia dismissed a female student's complaint of sexual harassment
because she failed to fit within either exception. 14 7 The plaintiff in the
case endured constant offensive remarks and unwelcome sexual advances
that eventually caused her to be hospitalized for suicidal depression, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and anorexia. 148 Throughout the harassment,
the plaintiffs teachers did little to address the situation despite being in-
formed of the harassment, and only after the plaintiff was hospitalized
were the offending boys suspended. 14 9 Upon her return to school, the
harassment continued and eventually forced the plaintiff to withdraw from
school and begin homeschooling.15 0 She sued the school for failing to
take prompt action and prevent the harassment.1 5 1
144. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
197 (1989) (concluding that "[a] State's failure to protect an individual against
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause").
145. See Secunda, supra note 143, at 26-27.
146. See Stevenson v. Martin County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 644, 648
(E.D.N.C. 1999) (explaining that precedent dictates presence of no special rela-
tionship between students and schools, and noting that "[a]n affirmative duty only
arises [between the state and student] when 'the state has exercised its power so as
to render an individual unable to care for himself or herself") (quoting J.0. v.
Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990)).
147. See Shores v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., No. Civ.A. 04-1325, 2005 WL
2071730, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2005) (concluding plaintiff did not qualify within
exceptions and school was not liable). Specifically, the court found in relevant
part that, "(1) [the school district] ha[d] no liability for the sexual harassment
which [plaintiff] experienced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a bodily in-
tegrity claim because [it] did not perpetrate the acts of harassment and there was
no special relationship between [the plaintiff] and [the school district]." Id.
148. See id. at *1 (describing facts of case).
149. See id. (describing facts of case). According to the record, the plaintiff
and her sister reported the harassment to the plaintiffs teacher. See id. The
teacher allowed the plaintiff to move her seat, but when the harassing students
moved their seats closer to the plaintiffs seat, the teacher took no further action.
See id. In addition, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the school guidance
counselor, but this effort also failed to stop the harassing students. See id. Rather,
disciplinary action was not taken against both harassing students until the plaintiff
was hospitalized. See id.
150. See id. (describing facts of case). The plaintiff returned on a half-day
schedule after being hospitalized, but was still subjected to harassment in the hall-
ways of the school by the two offending boys. See id. at *1-2. Consequently, the
plaintiff decided to permanently withdraw. See id. at *2.
151. See id. (describing procedural posture of case). In particular, the plain-
tiffs complaint alleged that the school was "deliberately indifferent to the harass-
ment which she experienced and because they failed to promptly take any action
to aid [the plantiff] and to prevent harassment," it should be held liable under§ 1983. Id.
294
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In dismissing the victim's Section 1983 claim, the court noted that the
school district did not engage in conduct that resulted in the violation of
the plaintiffs rights. 1 5 2 Moreover, the court refused to find that the
school-student relationship satisfied the special relationship exception, de-
spite the fact that the plaintiff was required to attend school.1 5 3 The court
held that even though the school could have taken more timely or effec-
tive measures to prevent the harassment, "the state [was not] constitution-
ally liable for all acts of violence between students." 1 5 4 Finding a special
relationship with a college student would prove more difficult because
compulsory attendance laws have no relevance.
The court also refused, in this case, to accept that the state created a
danger in violation of Section 1983.155 The state-created danger excep-
tion requires a showing of a school's conduct that is "so intentional or
reckless that it shocks the conscience of federal judges."1 5 6 Therefore,
although the school's efforts may have been inefficient, they did not rise
to a level of deliberate indifference.15 7
As to Section 1983 claims based on equal protection violations, the
framework depends on whether the defendant is an educational institu-
tion or an individual. To find a school liable, the school must either have
152. See id. at *3 (holding school district not liable under § 1983 claim be-
cause "[the] Plaintiff did not allege that teacher harassed her and state actors are
not liable under § 1983 if they did not perform the conduct that resulted in the
alleged violation of the plaintiffs rights").
153. See id. (rejecting plaintiffs notion of student-school special relationship
and dismissing plaintiffs § 1983 claim because exception was not satisfied). In
arriving at its conclusion that a special relationship did not exist between the plain-
tiff and school, the court relied on the Supreme Court's definition of "special rela-
tionship" as being formed
[w]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at
the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs . . . it trans-
gresses the substantive limits on state action set by . .. the Due Process
Clause.
Id. Consequently, because a student is not in "physical custody and, along with
parental help, is able to care for his basic human needs," no special relationship
exists. Id. at *3-4 (applying special relationship definition to school-student
relationship).
154. Id. at *4 (concluding that although additional measures could have been
taken, there was no constitutional violation based on established precedent).
155. See id. (articulating that § 1983 is subject to "state-created danger excep-
tion" wherein the "state has to take some affirmative steps" for exception to be
satisfied).
156. Id. (explaining that "state-created danger exception" requires "delibera-
tive indifference" by school and noting that this "is a very high standard to meet).
Specifically, the court clarified that "[f] iability does not arise when the state stands
by and does nothing in the face of danger" and "[flailing to protect an individual
from danger caused by a third party does not implicate the state in the harm." Id.
(commenting on parameters of state-created danger exception).
157. See id. (concluding that although school could have been more proactive
in terminating harassment of plaintiff, school's conduct did not meet requisite
standard of state-created danger).
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an official policy or custom allowing employees to engage in sexual harass-
ment, or the harassment must be the result of an action by an official with
final policymaking authority.' 5 8 To find an individual liable, courts re-
quire a showing that the individual was deliberately indifferent to known
sexual harassment.1 5 9
Although the standard for Section 1983 claims based on equal protec-
tion violations is relatively high, in a landmark case for gay and lesbian
youth, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could maintain his equal
protection claims even though his substantive due process rights were not
violated. 160 The case involved the harassment and physical abuse of a ho-
mosexual boy throughout middle school and high school. 1 61 Classmates
regularly called the plaintiff a "faggot" and subjected him to various forms
of physical abuse, including a mock rape.1 6 2 School officials responded to
the plaintiffs complaints by saying "boys will be boys" and that he should
"expect" such behavior if he was going to be openly gay.163 The court
allowed the plaintiffs claim to survive summary judgment based on evi-
dence that the school had a policy and habit of punishing perpetrators of
battery and harassment committed by males towards females, but refused
to enforce the same policy against the plaintiffs tormentors. 16 4 A jury
found the school officials liable, but before they could return a damage
verdict, the case settled for nearly one million dollars.1 6 5
158. See Secunda, supra note 143, at 28 (indicating that municipal liability
under § 1983 requires "an official policy or custom to engage in sexual harassment
or an action by an official with final policymaking authority").
159. See id. (summarizing § 1983 and Title IX requirements for individual and
employer liability).
160. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
plaintiff's arguments included that defendant school should be liable for "en-
hanc[ing] his risk of harm . . . because their policies encouraged a climate in
which he suffered harm" and agreeing that "defendants could be liable under a
due process theory if [the plaintiff] could show that the defendants created a risk
of harm, or exacerbated one").
161. See id. at 449 (describing facts of case).
162. See id. at 451 (describing facts of case).
163. See id. (describing facts of case).
164. See id. at 455 (describing facts and evidence of case). According to the
record, the defendants acknowledged that they "aggressively punished male-on-
female battery and harassment." Id. Although the defendants contended that they
pursued harassment of the plaintiff as vigorously as male-on-female battery, the
plaintiff presented evidence to support his claim that the investigation and punish-
ment for his offenders was not as aggressive. See id. (describing facts of case). Con-
sequently, the court rejected the defendants' motion for summary judgment
because this question was one of "credibility for the fact-finder." See id. (explaining
decision to deny defendants' motion for summary judgment in connection with
plaintiff's argument that school enhanced his risk of harm).
165. See Lambda Legal, Nabozny v. Podlesny, http://www.lambdalegal.org/
ourwork/in-court/cases/nabozny-v-podlesny.html (last visited May 17, 2010) (sum-
marizing outcome of case); see also Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324
F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing plaintiffs § 1983 claim alleging discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation to proceed and rejecting defendant's request
for summary judgment based upon presence of "sufficient evidence for the jury to
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3. State Civil Rights Laws
Because of the stringent requirements associated with federal harass-
ment statutes, some plaintiffs have opted to use state civil rights laws as a
basis for bullying suits. The NewJersey Supreme Court recently remanded
a case clarifying that Title IX's deliberate indifference standard did not
apply to New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD).166 This case in-
volved a student's persistent and severe harassment from elementary
school through high school based on his perceived sexual orientation.' 6 7
The student endured all types of homosexual epithets ("gay," "homo,"
"butt boy," "fudge packer"), as well as physical violence.' 6 8 Eventually, the
student changed high schools to avoid his tormentors. 169
The Administrative LawJudge (ALJ) that heard the student's case ap-
plied Title IX's standards and dismissed the case, finding that the school
district did not act deliberately indifferent.170 The Director of the Divi-
sion on Civil Rights rejected the ALJ's decision and awarded the plaintiff
damages, stating that the school knew or should have known about the
harassment and failed to take actions to stop it.171 The appellate court
affirmed in part and reversed in part, after which the school district peti-
tioned for certification on the question of whether the civil rights statute
provided a cause of action for peer harassment and what standard of liabil-
ity applies to such a claim.172
The New Jersey Supreme Court held the statute did allow a cause of
action for peer harassment based on the statute's "plain language, its
broad remedial goal, and the prevalent nature of peer sexual harass-
ment."17 3 The court also refused to accept the school's argument that the
standard of liability should mirror Title IX.174 The court differentiated
Title IX from LAD by noting that Title IX was grounded in Congress's
infer that defendants acted with deliberate indifference" where plaintiffs harassed
for years and school failed to "enforce ... policies to protect them"); Montgomery
v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1098 (D. Minn. 2000) (rejecting
motion to dismiss plaintiffs § 1983 claim).
166. See L.W. v. Toms River Reg'l Schs. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 548 (N.J.
2007) (rejecting deliberate indifference standard).
167. See id. at 539-544 (stating that student was verbally taunted since fourth
grade, was molested and faced physical aggression in middle school, and eventu-
ally transferred high schools due to continued harassment).
168. See id. at 539, 541, 543. "The remarks were so frequent in seventh grade
that L.W. testified that '[i]f I ma[d]e it through a day without comments, I was
lucky.'" Id. at 541.
169. See id. at 543.
170. See id. at 544.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 545.
173. Id. at 547.
174. See id. at 548.
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Spending Power and that the scope of the two statutes substantially
differed.' 7 5
4. State School Anti-Bullying Laws
Thirty-six states now have anti-bullying laws, with ten being passed in
the last two years.1 7 6 Unfortunately, these statutes vary widely with many
failing to include necessary components, thus limiting their effective-
ness.1 7 7 Many anti-bullying statutes are too deferential to the decision-
making powers of local school authorities in defining bullying and fash-
ioning remedies for violating the anti-bullying policy.' 7 8 In addition,
none of these statutes allow for a private cause of action.' 7 9 Finally, and
most importantly for purposes of this Article, these statutes are presently
limited to students in grades K-12, and would need to be amended to pro-
tect college and university students.
B. Legal Theories Not Based on Protected Class Membership
1. Tort Actions
A plaintiff may try to bring a lawsuit alleging numerous tort theories,
including negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.' 8 0 Universities' ability to avoid legal
liability has been premised on various theories over the decades.' 8 '
Before the 1960s, universities relied on the concept represented in the in
loco parentis era to insulate them from legal scrutiny.182 The bystander era,
which focused on student freedom and universities' lack of authority and
175. See id. at 549 (noting that Title IX and LAD differed on three grounds:(1) Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex only, (2) Title IX only prohibitsbeneficiaries of federal educational funds from discriminating against studentsdue to sex, and (3) LAD expressly authorizes private action to file causes of ac-
tions, whereas Title IX impliedly allows private right of action).
176. See generally Bully Police USA, www.bullypolice.org (last visited May 17,2010) (rating states' anti-bullying laws).
177. See Fred Hartmeister & Vickie Fix-Turkowski, Getting Even with Schoolyard
Bullies: Legislative Responses to Campus Provocateurs, 195 ED. L. REP. 1, 13-19 (2005).
178. See Susan Hanley Kosse & Robert H. Wright, How Best to Confront the Bully:
Should Title IX or Anti-Bullying Statutes Be the Answer?, 12 DuKE J. GENDER L. & Pot'v
53, 71 (2005).
179. For a further discussion of the lack of private action afforded by anti-
bullying statutes, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Complaint, Vilardo v. Daniel Webster College, available at http:/
/media.nashuatelegraph.com/assets/bullysuit.pdf (citing student's complaint of
college's gross negligence) (last visited May 17, 2010).
181. See generally ROBERT D. BICKEL & PETER F. LAKE, THE RIGHTS AND RESPON-
SIBILITIES OF THE MODERN UNIVERsrrY: WHO AssuMEs THE RISK OF COLLEGE LIFE?(1999).
182. See id. at 7.
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control of students, imposed little or no responsibility on universities to
protect students from harm.1 83
The most significant barrier to these actions is establishing that a uni-
versity or college has a general duty to provide a safe learning environ-
ment.184 Generally, no duty exists to keep a student safe from the acts of a
third party, and a majority of courts have rejected the university-student
relationship alone as a basis for liability.1 85 Courts likewise dismiss the
custodian-charge relationship as establishing a duty because college stu-
dents are adults who are able to take care of themselves.1 86
Today, with front-page news reporting hazing, harassment, and other
violence on campus, uncertainty exists as to whether a college or university
owes any duty at all to its students.18 7 Although most courts do not auto-
matically impose a duty as a matter of law, courts seem willing to reconcep-
tualize the student-university relationship and find colleges and
universities responsible for student safety under certain fact patterns when
special relationships exist.188 Successful lawsuits against universities have
been based on a business-invitee relationship if the harmful act by the
third person was foreseeable.18 9 In addition, some courts have found a
duty based on a landlord-tenant relationship or a protector-protectorate
relationship. 19 0 Not all states, however, recognize these duties with uni-
183. See id. at 7-8. An often cited case for this proposition is a Third Circuit
case, where the court stated:
College students today are no longer minors; they are now regarded as
adults in almost every phase of community life. . . . There was a time
when college administrators and faculties assumed a role [i]n loco paren-
tis. ... But today students vigorously claim the right to define and regu-
late their own lives.
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 13940 (3d Cir. 1979).
184. See Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 730 A.2d 1086, 1093 (Vt. 1999) (finding
that university owed duty of reasonable care to avoid harm to plaintiff); see also
Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, The Emergence of New Paradigms in Student-Univer-
sity Relations: From "In Loco Parentis" to Bystander to Facilitator, 23J.C. & U.L. 755, 780
(1997)
185. See Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 141-142; see also Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 861
P.2d 768, 778 (Kan. 1993); Rhaney v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, 880 A.2d 357, 364
(Md. 2005).
186. See Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 517 (Del. 1991) (stating that
custodial relationship is not possible because students are adults). See also Aliza M.
Milner, Cause of Action Against College or University for Injury Inflicted on Student by
Third Party, 31 CAUSES OF Ac-roN 2D 675, §§ 7-8 (2007) (stating that student may
rely on custodian charge relationship for tort liability but, thus far, plaintiffs have
not been successful on these grounds).
187. See id. § 12. For a further discussion of the extent to which universities
owe their students duties, see Bickel & Lake supra note 184, at 780.
188. For an example of when a court imposed a duty on universities, see infra
notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
189. See Milner, supra 186, § 9 (stating that courts will discern if university
should have foreseen harm by deciding whether it punished or tried to prevent
similar harm in past).
190. See id. § 10 (stating that landlords will be held liable for harmful conduct
if they knew or should have known about third parties' actions).
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versities and students; therefore, no bright line rule can be articulated re-
garding a college or university's tort liability.19 1
The rise of hazing litigation has given courts the opportunity to revisit
the question of whether a university or college ever undertakes a duty to
protect a student's safety. Some courts have found colleges and universi-
ties liable for student injuries resulting from third party action when such
conduct was reasonably foreseeable by the university, 192 when the univer-
sity failed to investigate hazing incidents, 19 3 and when the university's haz-
ing policy was not enforced.' 94 This area is highly fact-specific, although a
few courts recognize that colleges and universities owe a duty of reasona-
ble care as to a student's safety, and use traditional tort principles when
evaluating the college or university's acts or omissions.195
In one case, the Delaware Supreme Court found the University of
Delaware owed a duty to one of its students, Jeffrey Furek, who was perma-
nently injured during his fraternity's "hell night."19 6 During the course of
the evening, a fraternity member poured lye-based liquid oven cleaner on
the pledge's body resulting in permanent scarring.19 7 The court held
"where there is direct university involvement in, and knowledge of, certain
dangerous practices of its students, the university cannot abandon its
residual duty of control."19 8 Evidence existed that the university knew of
the fraternity hazing rituals and the dangers associated with them, and
had officially reminded the fraternities of the university's prohibition of
hazing several times.' 9 9 The court based its decision on Restatement of Torts
Section 323, which addresses the duty owed by one who assumes direct
responsibility for the safety of another through the rendering of services in
the area of protection.2 00 The court rejected the university's argument
that it had not assumed a duty, instead finding the university's policy
against hazing the basis for the duty.201 The court also ruled that the uni-
versity's liability could be premised on a landowner's obligation to keep
the premises safe from known dangerous conditions because the plaintiffs
injuries would be foreseeable to university officials based on their knowl-
191. See id. § 20.
192. See Knoll v. Bd. of Regents, 601 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Neb. 1999).
193. See Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, 738 So. 2d 1105, 1117 (La.
Ct. App. 1999).
194. See Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 518 (Del. 1991).
195. See Bickel & Lake, supra note 184, at 761.
196. See Furek, 594 A.2d at 509.
197. See id. at 510.
198. Id. at 520. "'The University's policy against hazing, like its overall com-
mitment to provide security on its campus, thus constituted an assumed duty which
became 'an indispensable part of the bundle of services which colleges . . . afford
their students.'" Id. (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 336
(Mass. 1983)).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 518-19.
201. See id. at 520.
300 [Vol. 55: p. 269
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol55/iss2/1
COLLEGE BULLIES
edge that hazing occurred on campus. 202 In sum, although the court
agreed that colleges and universities were not insurers of a student's safety,
it refused to relieve them of a duty to regulate and supervise foreseeable,
dangerous activities occurring on campus property.
Bullying cases remain a relatively new phenomenon and few pub-
lished settlements or verdicts of bullying cases exist. Based on the hazing
cases it would appear that colleges and universities could be held liable if
courts can find a duty and the injury is foreseeable. Student handbooks
prohibiting bullying behavior may provide the basis for the duty, much
like the anti-hazing policy did in the Furek case. A victim would also need
to prove the university knew about the bullying, similar to its knowledge of
hazing activities.
The holding in Furek, however, should not be overstated because it
appears to limit the duty to "those instances where [the university] exer-
cises control."203 Arguably, a difference exists between hazing in the con-
text of a sanctioned university organization, which the university has more
control over, than a random bully that attends the university. Perhaps
courts will not yet extend the duty outside of the hazing context, but that
does not mean that they will not one day find such a duty. Culturally,
society may be shifting in that direction. The court in Furek specifically
noted that changes in "societal attitudes toward alcohol use and hazing"
seriously eroded previous decisions finding universities not liable for third
party actions against studentS.204 The court had no issue requiring univer-
sities to comply with self-imposed standards (for example, the anti-hazing
policy), unlike many previous cases which specifically found school poli-
cies did not create a duty upon the university to keep students safe from
third parties.20 5 As society deepens its understanding of bullying and its
detrimental impact, courts may more often find the existence of a duty if
universities and colleges publish codes and policies prohibiting harass-
ment. Hazing and bullying produce some of the same damage to the vic-
tim, and courts may determine "the likelihood of injury... is greater than
the utility of university inaction."206
Recent cases seem to imply juries are willing to hold schools liable at
least at the elementary and high school level. For example, a Florida jury
awarded a victim of bullying four million dollars against his private
school.20 7 In that case, a known bully broke a seventh grader's arm, which
202. See id. at 520-21.
203. See id. at 522.
204. See id. at 523.
205. See id. at 517 (discussing Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah
1986), which refused to find university liable for student's alcohol-related injury at
university-sponsored event even though she was with faculty member and univer-
sity had policy prohibiting alcohol use).
206. Id. at 523.
207. See Colleen Jenkins, Bullying Costs School $4M, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct.
23, 2007, at 1A, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2007.
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resulted in paralysis and trouble controlling his fingers. 208 As a ranked
tennis player, this had a lasting and detrimental impact on his life. 209 Pre-
viously, the victim's parents had complained to the principal of prior as-
saults and asked that their son be protected.2 1 0 The school district
appealed the verdict and the parties reached a confidential settlement.21 1
In a similar case, a jury in Tonganoxie, Kansas awarded a bullying
victim $250,000, with interest and costs. 2 12 The case eventually settled for
$440,000 in January 2006 after the school district appealed the verdict.2 13
The boy filed Title IX and Section 1983 actions, as well as a negligent
supervision claim for the constant sexual harassment he endured for three
years. 2 14 The bullies called him a faggot and continually spread rumors
about the boy masturbating in the restroom. 2 15
Other suits have settled before reaching a trial. For example, five
girls in Casey County, Kentucky settled their bullying lawsuit during the
summer of 2008.216 The settlement is confidential, but it did include
monetary damages and required the school to change its procedures and
rules.2 17 The girls alleged that they were verbally and physically abused
and that school officials discounted or downplayed the bullying.2 18 In
fact, one school official purportedly told a victim she needed to "toughen
up."21 9
Additional suits have been recently filed by more children in other
Kentucky counties. 220 Parents who filed one of the suits blame the school
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See E-mail from David Tirella, Adjunct Professor of Law, Stetson Univ.
Coll. of Law, to Susan H. Duncan, Associate Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis
Sch. of Law: Univ. of Louisville (Feb. 19, 2009 11:08:00 EDT) (on file with author).
212. See Verdict and Summary, Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No.
464, No. 04-2195-JWL, 2005 WL 2716272 (D. Kan. Aug. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.bensonlaw.com/bully/verdict.pdf (last visited May 17, 2010).
213. See Benson & Associates, School Bullying Case, http://www.bensonlaw.
com/bully/index.html (last visited May 17, 2010).
214. See Complaint, Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, No. 04-
2195-JWL, 2005 WL 2716272 (D. Kan. Aug. 11, 2005), available at http://
www.bensonlaw.com/bully/complaint.pdf (last visited May 17, 2010).
215. See id.
216. See Todd Kleffman, Settlement Reached in Casey Bullying Lawsuit, AMNEWS.
coM, http://www.amnews.com/stories/2008/06/27/cas.41952.sto (last visited
May 17, 2010) (free log-in required).
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See Bill Estep, Casey County School Officials are Sued Over Alleged Bullying,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, July 26, 2006, at Al.
220. See Connie Leonard, Three Families File Suit Over School Bullying, WAVE3,
http://www.wave3.com/ (search website for "Three Families File"; then scroll
down search page for hyperlink to article).
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for their child's suicide. 22 1 Suicides that result from bullying have become
common enough to be referred to as "bullycide."22 2 As evidenced by the
many bullying lawsuits filed across the country, Kentucky parents are not
the only ones angry about how their child's school deals with bullying.2 23
As the public becomes more aware of the nature and dangers of bully-
ing, there is no reason why colleges will not also be named in bullying
lawsuits. For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's dismissal of a claim, which alleged that Morehouse College fos-
tered an atmosphere of hatred and violence towards homosexuals. 22 4
This case received national attention because of its potential to expand a
university's duty to its students. 22 5 Morehouse admits it owes a duty of
safety to its students but not "'a heightened duty or responsibility for mat-
ters of morals and virtues.' "226 This is not the only case trying to push the
envelope. In fact, in a New Hampshire case filed in November 2007, a
student asked the court to recognize a duty requiring colleges to protect
students from bullies. 227 The case, set for trial in August 2009, specifically
involves tort causes of actions arising from various instances of bullying.2 28
Even if the college owes a duty to the student and breaches that duty,
sovereign immunity in many states bars an action against a college or uni-
versity, unless consent to sue has been expressly granted.229 Lawsuits may
be dismissed because the universities are instrumentalities of the state and
are therefore immune from suit.23 0 Some states attempt to limit the appli-
cation of sovereign immunity by applying a distinction between govern-
mental and discretionary functions versus proprietary and operational
221. See id. (reporting that one student shot himself as result of school
bullying).
222. See generally Bullycide in America, http://www.bullycide.org/ (last visited
May 17, 2010).
223. See generally Raad Cawthon, Parents of Bullies' Victims Fight Back by Suing
Schools, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 27, 1999, at Al; Jeff Holtz, Worth Noting; Par-
ents File Lawsuit Over Bullying of Daughter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at CT2; Martha
Neil, Bullied at School for Years, Billy Wolfe Brings Suit, with His Parents' Help, Mar. 24,
2008, http://abajournal.com/news/bullied-atschool-for-years-billywolfe
brings-suit with his-parents-help/; Tatiana Zarnowski, Parents Sue Over Bullying,
THE SENTINEL (Harrisburg, Pa.), Dec. 23, 2003, http://www.cumberlink.com/
articles/2003/ 12/23/news/news03.txt.
224. See Love v. Morehouse Coll., Inc., 652 S.E.2d 624, 624 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007).
225. See generally Steve Sanders, Should Colleges Be Sued for Harboring Intoler-
ance?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Feb. 22, 2008, at A31.
226. Id.
227. See Complaint, Vilardo v. Daniel Webster College, supra note 180. This
case was scheduled for trial Aug. 3, 2009.
228. See id.
229. See Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Political Sub-
divisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. 2006).
230. See Setrin v. Glassboro State Coll., 346 A.2d 102, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975).
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functions, only allowing suits for the latter.2 31 The governmental/propri-
etary distinction is essentially a question of fact, which makes a bright line
test for its application nearly impossible, resulting in a confusing body of
law. 23 2 In addition, some states cap damages further curtailing recovery
for plaintiffs. Finally, some attorneys may be reluctant to file a suit unless
a permanent injury exists.
2. Breach of Contract
In addition to traditional tort claims, students may also file breach of
contract claims based on promises made by the college prior to and dur-
ing a student's enrollment. This option may be the only available remedy
in jurisdictions where sovereign immunity bars tort suits. Case law sup-
ports the proposition that student handbooks can form a contract between
students and universities. 23 3 Most of those cases focus on academic issues
such as decisions involving grades, degrees, or disciplinary matters.2 34 As
one scholar notes, "[c] ourts will intervene if the student provides evidence
of a breach of a specific promise made or the non-performance of a spe-
cific service purported to be available to the student."2 3 5
Students victimized by bullies at colleges may start to bring breach of
contract suits based on broad policies prohibiting all types of harassment
contained in student handbooks or student codes. The contract prohibit-
ing bullying may give rise to an action between the bully and the univer-
sity, but not the victim, unless the victim is somehow a third party
beneficiary of the contract prohibiting the bullying. Otherwise, the uni-
versity would have to make a contract with the victim directly that involves
keeping the victim sheltered from bullying. These promises could be
based on implied or expressed terms. Although an express promise pro-
tecting students from bullying may not exist, handbooks and other docu-
ments may include broad enough provisions to serve as the basis for a
breach of contract claim. In fact, a student in Massachusetts recently sued
his college for breach of contract for failing to provide a safe environment
for students with proper supervision, reasonably disciplined students, and
properly trained staff and supervisors as promised by its handbook.2 3 6
Although most cases utilizing a contract theory turn on academic is-
sues, a few courts have examined this theory in relation to injury by a third
party. A New York district court denied Cornell University's motion for
231. See Autry v. W. Ky. Univ., No. 2004-CA-000216-MR, 2005 WL 497193 (Ky.
Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2005), affd in part and rev'd in part, 219 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 2007).
232. SeeAvallone v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Citrus County, 493 So. 2d 1002(Fla. 1986).
233. See Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 53 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 14 (Ohio Ct. Cl.
1990).
234. See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Colleges and Universities § 25 (2009).
235. Kerry Brian Melear, Contracts with Students, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
HICHER EDUCATION LAw 228 Joseph Beckham & David Dagley eds., 2005).
236. For a discussion of this case, see supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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summary judgment holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to whether either the university or the victim failed to meet obligations
under an implied contract governing dormitory security.2 3 7 In this case,
the parents of a student who was murdered in her dormitory room by her
roommate's disappointed suitor argued a series of pamphlets, brochures,
and other documents supplied by Cornell to prospective and enrolled stu-
dents, constituted part of a contract which made promises about certain
safety procedures.23 8 In denying Cornell's motion for summaryjudgment
and allowing the case to continue, the court refused to accept Cornell's
argument that these materials failed to create an implied contract. 239
Other courts, however, refuse to allow contract claims to proceed when
the complaint actually seeks recovery for a tort.2 40
Additionally, mental anguish and emotional distress damages are usu-
ally more difficult to recover in contract actions because they must be a
foreseeable consequence of a particular breach of contract.24 1 A person
must allege specific suffering above the ordinary trauma a broken contract
causes a reasonable person. 2 42 Mere generalizations about trauma are in-
sufficient to establish liability.2 4 3
3. State Generic Anti-Bullying Laws
In addition to anti-bullying statutes that focus on schools, several
states are considering passing healthy workplace bills, which would pro-
hibit generic bullying in employment situations. 244 Generic bullying or
"status neutral harassment" is different from harassment because it is not
directed towards a person who is a member of a protected class; therefore,
"status neutral harassment" is not currently prohibited by federal or state
statute. Recognizing the real and substantial harm this type of bullying
produces at the workplace and the failure of current laws to regulate it,
237. See Nieswand v. Cornell Univ., 692 F. Supp. 1464, 1468 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
238. See id. at 1469-70.
239. See id. at 1470.
240. See, e.g., Crow v. State, 222 Cal. App. 3d 192, 206 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (dismissing contractual claims because student failed to properly identify
them in administrative complaint but acknowledged "duck-rabbit" question when
student was actually suing in tort); Delaney v. Univ. of Houston, 792 S.W.2d 733,
739 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (dismissing contract claims because claim arose out of
intentional tort).
241. See Univ. of S. Miss. v. Williams, 891 So. 2d 160, 172 (Miss. 2004) (discuss-
ing difficulty of being awarded mental anguish damages in breach of contract
actions).
242. See id. at 173.
243. See id.
244. See New York Healthy Workplace Advocates, Healthy Workplace Bill Leg-
islative History in the United States, http://www.nyhwa.org/7.html (last visited
May 17, 2010); see also Susan Harthill, Bullying in the Workplace: Lessons from the
United Kingdom, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 247 (2008); David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon
of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for a Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protec-
tion, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000).
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legislators in at least thirteen states have introduced anti-bullying healthy
workplace bills.24 5 Similar laws exist in several countries in Europe. 246
Many employment lawyers and company officials strongly object to
proposed healthy workplace bills. Opponents of the bills argue it is al-
ready difficult to manage existing illegal workplace harassment and these
bills would open the door too wide.2 4 7 They fear an avalanche of lawsuits
would result from people complaining about tough bosses instead of legit-
imate abuse. Finally, defending such suits would be costly to companies
and clog the courts. Legislatures appear to be listening to these concerns,
as all healthy workplace bills have died or are languishing in state legisla-
tures. Nevertheless, proponents of the bills vow to continue to advocate
their adoption. Universities should therefore be aware of this emerging
employment issue and monitor its potential applicability to college
campuses.
IV. How SHOULD COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES DEAL WITH BULLIES?
Colleges and universities need to adopt a multifaceted approach of
intervention, prevention, and enforcement to address bullying on their
campuses. Ideally, colleges should adopt these procedures voluntarily, but
legislation much like the K-12 anti-bullying statutes may be necessary for
some institutions. In particular, the legislation may be necessary for those
institutions that refuse to address the bullying problem either because
they still do not fully understand the problem or the consequences that
result from ignoring bullying. This multifaceted approach of interven-
tion, prevention, and enforcement on campuses would include:
* Conducting empirical research on the prevalence, nature,
and impact of college bullying;
* Initiating programs and providing resources that increase the
knowledge and understanding of the nature, causes, and his-
tory of harassment and bullying;
* Implementing bullying prevention policies and procedures;
* Creating procedures for reporting and investigating acts of
harassment, intimidation, or bullying; and
245. See New York Healthy Workplace Advocates, supra note 244.
246. See Rebecca Morris, "Healthy Workplace Bill" Would Protect Employees Who
Feel the Bite of a Tormenting Boss, SEATTLE TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2008, at KI (listing En-
gland, France, Norway, and Sweden as all protecting bullied employees); see also
Sarah Morris, The Anti-Bullying Legislative Movement: Too Quick To Quash Common
Law Remedies?, 65 BENCH AND B. MINN. 22, 23 (2008) (describing various anti-bully-
ing workplace bans in Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, and Quebec).
247. See Carolyn Said, Bullying Bosses Could be Busted/Movement Against Worst
Workplace Abusers Gain Momentum With Proposed Laws, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 21, 2007,
available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-01-21/business/17227991_I-bullying-
workplace-domestic-violence.
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* Providing support for victims of bullying and appropriate con-
sequences and remedial action for those (a) committing har-
assment or bullying, (b) falsely reporting, or (c) retaliating
against someone who reports.
A. Research
To adequately answer the question of how colleges and universities
should deal with this problem, the first thing institutions need to do is
conduct more social science research on the prevalence, nature, and im-
pact of college bullying. Although this may not sound like a strong solu-
tion, research and data are vital in determining the steps necessary to
adequately address the problem. This information already exists for chil-
dren in K-12 and should be evaluated to determine its relevance in the
university setting.248 Without concrete data concerning the prevalence of
the problem, designing a solution becomes problematic. Researching this
Article exposed a huge gap in the literature about bullying, especially re-
garding college bullying. Administrators need to give an equivalent level
of attention that currently exists for K-12 and workplace bullying to col-
lege bullying to ascertain the nature of the problem. The only way col-
leges and universities will be able to address the problem in a truly
meaningful way is with this concrete evidence.
In addition to this global research, colleges and universities should
engage in climate assessments of their own campuses. Specifically, col-
leges should investigate whether students and employees know the differ-
ent types of behavior that constitute bullying and its long-term effects.2 4 9
In addition, colleges need to ascertain whether students and employees
know how to report bullying incidents and whether they are familiar with
the policies and procedures regarding bullying.25 0 Finally, although more
difficult than in K-12 settings, colleges should review how they identify bul-
lies and victims.25 1
B. Anti-Bullying Programs
Experts in the K-12 setting stress the importance of prevention and,
therefore, recommend developing anti-bullying programs and initia-
tives. 252 These are particularly important because drafting anti-bullying
policies that pass constitutional muster remains very difficult. As a result,
248. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 3.
249. See MARY A. LENTZ, LENTZ SCHOOL SECURITY § 6:10 (2008) (discussing
how to "identify, stop, [and] prevent" bullying in school settings).
250. See id. (same).
251. See Bryan Coplin, Bullying Presents Nationwide Problem: Little Research Exists
for College-Level Violence, Harassment, JOURNAL, Sept. 27, 2007, available at http://
media.www.webujournal.com/media/storage/paper 24 5/news/ 2 00 7 /0 9 / 2 7 /
News/Bullying.Presents.Nationwide.Problem-2993236.shtml.
252. For a discussion of the most widely proven program, see infra note 254.
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developing a positive school culture and climate of mutual respect and
tolerance may be a better approach than using student conduct codes to
punish offenders. Such programs require staff training and support, as
well as a financial commitment. Consequently, programs for colleges and
universities should be designed carefully to ensure that they justify the fi-
nancial and personnel investment colleges must make using their scarce
resources.
Although K-12 bullying prevention strategies, anti-bullying policies,
and anti-bully prevention programs may provide colleges and universities
with some guidance, the unique nature of the college environment-with
its residential components and the more advanced age of students-will
most likely require a different type of approach. The following are some
of the common criteria used by federal agencies to review and identify
effective drug and violence prevention programs that have equal applica-
bility to any program designed for use in colleges and universities:
Quality of Program Design
* Program goals and objectives are clear and appropriate for
the target population.
* Program content and methods address the needs of and ef-
fectively engage the target population.
* The program's underlying rationale is well-articulated, and its
content and methods are aligned with its goals.
* The program is a complete intervention, rather than a single
component (e.g., a video, an assembly, a book in the library).
Quality of Research Design
* Program evaluation includes pre- and post-testing with a con-
trol or comparison group.
* Program evaluation includes relevant, reliable, valid, and ap-
propriately administered outcome measures.
* Data analysis was technically adequate and appropriate.
* Evaluation studies had low rates of participant attrition.
Evidence of Program Efficacy
* The intervention produced positive change in scientifically es-
tablished risk and protective factors.
* The intervention reduced or delayed the onset, prevalence,
and/or individual rates of risk behaviors.
* Follow-up measurement provides evidence of sustained pro-
gram impact.
Capacity for Replication and Dissemination
* The program includes high-quality program materials (e.g.,
manuals), training, and technical assistance.
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* The program includes tools and procedures to monitor the
fidelity of implementation and evaluate program outcomes.
* The program has been replicated and produced similar posi-
tive results, and these replications have been documented.
* Evaluation findings have been published or accepted for pub-
lication by a peer-reviewed journal. 253
The most proven and widely replicated anti-bullying program remains
the Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, named after its founder, Dan
Olweus. 254 The program begins with a survey to determine the prevalence
of the problem. Training follows the survey, which helps raise awareness
among specific teachers, students, and parents. At the start of the school
year, rules are established and teachers closely supervise areas where bully-
ing likely occurs. Finally, interventions are regularly held with bullies, vic-
tims, and their parents. Studies have reported a reduction in the incidents
of bullying and other anti-social behavior after schools implement the
Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, thereby earning the respect of many
educators and agencies. 2 55
Several logistical challenges exist with designing a similar approach
for college students. Part of the Olweus program involves class meetings
and teachers setting positive and negative consequences for certain anti-
bullying and bullying behaviors respectively. The expansive nature of a
college campus makes adapting such a model very difficult.
C. Anti-Bullying Policies
Anti-bullying policies are another common K-12 response adopted by
schools as required by anti-bullying statutes. Besides setting the tone for
the school that bullying will not be tolerated, it also serves as proof that
school officials are not deliberately indifferent to the problem. Schools
need to be careful when drafting a policy because courts often invalidate
them on overbreadth or vagueness grounds. Recent litigation concerning
the regulation of anti-homosexual and anti-racist speech in the K-12 set-
ting should be carefully followed to determine whether courts might be
softening their approach to schools attempting to curb derogatory and
demeaning speech.
Traditionally, courts have been skeptical of speech regulations rigidly
guarding First Amendment liberties. In perhaps the most often quoted
case involving an anti-harassment policy, the Third Circuit found that a
253. U.S. Dep't of Educ., EXPLORING THE NATURE AND PREVErTION OF BULLY-
ING: FEDERAL CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING EFFECTwE PROGRAMs, http://www.ed.gov/
admins/lead/safety/training/bullying/bullyingpg22.html (last visited May 17,
2010).
254. See Olweus, The Olweus Bullying Prevention Program Overview, http://
iww.olweus.org/public/bullying-prevention-program.page?menuheader=2 (last
visited May 17, 2010).
255. See Olweus, Research and History, http://www.olweus.org/public/
bullyingjresearch.page?menuheader=2 (last visited May 17, 2010).
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Pennsylvania public school district violated students' First Amendment
rights when the district adopted an anti-harassment policy.2 5 6 The policy
sought to eliminate disrespectful behavior to help meet its goal of "provid-
ing all students with a safe, secure, and nurturing school environment."2 5 7
The policy prohibited harassment defined as:
verbal or physical conduct based on one's actual or perceived
race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has the
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a student's edu-
cational performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or of-
fensive environment.25 8
Prohibited conduct included:
any unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct which of-
fends, denigrates or belittles an individual because of any charac-
teristics described above.. . . [including] unsolicited derogatory
remarks, jokes, demeaning comments or behaviors, slurs, mim-
icking, name calling, graffiti, innuendo, gestures, physical con-
tact, stalking, threatening, bullying, extorting or the display or
circulation of written materials or pictures.25 9
Punishments for the harassment included "warning, exclusion, suspen-
sion, expulsion, transfer, termination, discharge, .. . training, education,
or counseling."2 60
A guardian of two public school students brought a lawsuit alleging
the policy was unconstitutional on its face.2 6 1 The students, avowed Chris-
tians, believed their religion required them to "speak out about the sinful
nature and harmful effects of homosexuality." 262 The students requested
that the court declare the policy unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. 2 63
The federal district court dismissed the case, holding that the policy
was facially constitutional. 26 4 The court read the policy as mirroring the
standard already codified in Pennsylvania's Human Relations Act, Title
VII, and Title IX.2 65 The court read the second paragraph defining har-
assment as prohibiting "language or conduct which is based on specified
256. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001).
257. Id. at 202.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 202-03.
260. Id. at 203.
261. See id.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 203-)4.
264. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 77 F. Supp. 2d 261, 267 (M.D. Pa.
1999).
265. See id. at 626.
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characteristics and which has the effect of 'substantially interfering with a
student's educational performance' or which creates a hostile educational
atmosphere." 266 This language is virtually the same standard used by Title
IX, and therefore, only prohibits actions that are already illegal.
2
'
7 The
court also refused to accept the plaintiff's vagueness argument as it deter-
mined that defining harassment any more precisely may be impossible.
2 6 8
Finally, the district court opined that the First Amendment did not protect
harassment.2 6 9
In reversing the district court, the Third Circuit refused to accept a
"harassment exception" to the First Amendment. 270 Furthermore, the
harassment policy extended beyond the scope of the anti-discrimination
laws.2 71 Though Title VII and Title IX cover discrimination based on sex,
race, color, national origin, age, and disability, the policy in question cov-
ered "other personal characteristics" such as "clothing," "appearance,"
"hobbies and values," and "social skills."2 72
The court determined that the policy was too broad to survive consti-
tutional scrutiny, and could not satisfy the Supreme Court's test to deter-
mine when student speech can be permissibly regulated.2 73 As the policy
extended to non-vulgar, non-school sponsored speech, the proper test the
court must use was set out in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District.274 The policy failed Tinker's test because it included speech
that did not actually cause disruption, but merely intended to do so.
2 7 5
The court stated:
[A]s Tinker made clear, the "undifferentiated fear or apprehen-
sion of disturbance" is not enough to justify a restriction on stu-
dent speech. Although [State College Area School District]
correctly asserts that it has a compelling interest in promoting an
educational environment that is safe and conducive to learning,
it fails to provide any particularized reason as to why it anticipates
substantial disruption from the broad swath of student speech
prohibited under the Policy.276
Adopting anti-harassment, anti-bullying, or other speech code has
proved to be equally difficult in the collegiate setting. Several student
266. Id. at 625.
267. See id. at 626.
268. See id. at 625.
269. See id.
270. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2001).
271. See id. at 210-11.
272. Id. at 210.
273. See id. at 216-17; see also Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp.
2d 446, 459 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that school district's policy was overbroad
and vague).
274. 339 U.S. 503 (1969); see also Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216 (referencing Tinker).
275. See id.
276. Id. at 217.
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speech and anti-harassment codes have been struck down. The Eastern
District of Michigan struck down the University of Michigan's Policy on
Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment of Students in the Univer-
sity Environment because it was overbroad and vague.2 77 Although lauda-
ble goals existed for the policy, the court found the policy "swept within its
scope a significant amount of 'verbal conduct' or 'verbal behavior' which
is unquestionably protected speech under the First Amendment."2 7 8 The
policy specifically prohibited individuals from "'stigmatizing or victimiz-
ing' individuals or groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sex-
ual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
handicap, or Vietnam-era veteran status." 279
Challenging the constitutionality of the policy, a psychology graduate
student filed suit and argued that the policy prevented him from discuss-
ing certain controversial theories in his discipline concerning differences
between sexes and races because others might be offended.28 0 In uphold-
ing the challenge, the court distinguished pure speech, which cannot be
regulated, from discriminatory conduct, which is unprotected by the First
Amendment.2 81 Recognizing the importance of "free and unfettered" dis-
cussion in a learning environment, the court made clear that speech could
not be regulated solely because it is offensive to many people or because
the university disagrees with the ideas or message being communicated.28 2
The Supreme Court has also stated that "the mere dissemination of
ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university cam-
pus may not be shut off in the name of 'conventions of decency"'
alone.28 3
Subsequent courts followed the same analysis and subsequently struck
down university speech and anti-harassment codes. 284 This trend has con-
tinued since the late 1980s with the Middle District of Pennsylvania strik-
ing down Shippensburg University's speech code in 2003.285 Before
analyzing the particular code, the court noted that elementary and secon-
277. See Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
278. Id. at 853.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 858.
281. See id. at 861.
282. See id. at 863.
283. Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 669 (1973).
284. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1993)(overturning statute for being vague and broad); Booher v. Bd. of Regents of N.
Ky. Univ., No. 2:96-cv-135, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11404 (E.D. Ky. July 22, 1998)(finding university's harassment policy unconstitutional because it was vague and
overbroad); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 774 F. Supp.
1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down code that would prohibit students from
demeaning others based on certain categories such as race, gender, and religion);Corry v. Leland Standford Jr. Univ. (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1995), available athttp://www.ithaca.edu/faculty/cduncan/265/corryvstanford.htm (overruling
speech code unconstitutional).
285. See Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
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dary schools have more leeway in regulating student speech than universi-
ties do.28 6 Similar to the previous cases involving collegiate speech codes,
the court ruled the code's prohibition on "acts of intolerance" violated the
Constitution because it was overbroad. 287
Interestingly, after these court decisions, some colleges have not dis-
regarded their policies and others have adopted policies.288 This does not
insinuate that administrators are not concerned about the policies' consti-
tutionality, however, because many colleges and universities do not ac-
tively enforce the policies.2 89 Yet administrators still consider the policies
valuable because they act as a powerful symbol that actually affects behav-
ior on campus and increases civility. 29 0 Surveys also illustrate that students
are willing to accept this regulation concerning their free speech rights,
with over two-thirds of incoming freshman approving hate speech
prohibitions. 291
The general population also mirrors the students' willingness to regu-
late hate speech. 292 Additionally, some legal commentators question the
existing absolutist approach to the First Amendment and urge a balance
between freedom of speech and other democratic values.29 3 Commenta-
tors contend that the courts and civil libertarians underestimate the horri-
ble effect insulting words have on classes of people. 294 Recent cases
involving K-12 policies reveal that the judiciary's previous hostility toward
speech regulations is softening, specifically in cases that involve efforts to
regulate anti-homosexual or anti-racist speech. Judges deciding several re-
cent cases permitting regulation of anti-homosexual speech and other
demeaning speech in high schools and elementary schools seem to under-
stand the dangers associated with permitting such offensive speech in the
educational system.
These holdings, however, have been limited to secondary schools. 2 95
For example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a school's decision to forbid a stu-
286. See id. at 369.
287. See id. at 370 (finding statute overbroad, and court did not analyze
whether statute may also suffer from vagueness).
288. SeeJoN B. GOULD, SPEAK No EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH REGULA-
TION 150 (2005).
289. See id. at 175.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 176.
292. See id. at 177.
293. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, in WoRDs THAr WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 53, 53-58 (Mari Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
294. See id. at 57.
295. See, e.g., Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965,
967 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (granting injunction forbidding school from preventing stu-
dent from wearing his anti-gay T-shirt that read "Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is a
lie! Abortion is murder! Some issues are just black and white!"); Chambers v.
Babbitt, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1069 (D. Minn. 2001) (enjoining school from
prohibiting student from wearing "Straight Pride" sweatshirt).
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dent from wearing an anti-gay T-shirt to school because it violated others'
rights. 296 The court stated:
Those who administer our public educational institutions need
not tolerate verbal assaults that may destroy the self-esteem of our
most vulnerable teenagers and interfere with their educational
development. To the contrary, the School had a valid and lawful
basis for restricting Harper's wearing of his T-shirt on the ground
that his conduct was injurious to gay and lesbian students and
interfered with their right to learn.29 7
The court heavily weighed sources that demonstrated the detrimental aca-
demic and psychological effects of student speech that demeaned gay and
lesbian students or other protected classes. 298 The court specifically lim-
ited its decision to conduct that occurs in public high schools and in ele-
mentary schools-not colleges and universities. The court justified this
distinction by noting that "young adults acquire more strength and matur-
ity, and specifically as they reach college age, they become adequately
equipped emotionally and intellectually to deal with the type of verbal as-
saults that may be prohibited during their earlier years."29 9 In another
case that upheld a school's restriction of anti-homosexual speech, the
Northern District of Illinois specifically noted that the only appropriate
context to regulate the speech would be in the high school setting.3 00
Courts are also appearing more lenient with restrictions prohibiting
racist speech. The Tenth Circuit upheld a racial harassment and intimida-
tion policy that prohibited district employees and students from "racially
harass[ing] or intimidat[ing] another student(s) by name calling, using
racial or derogatory slurs, wearing or possess[ing] . . . items depicting or
implying racial hatred or prejudice."3 0 The lawsuit followed after a mid-
dle school student was suspended for drawing the Confederate Flag dur-
ing math class. 302 In upholding the school's disciplinary actions, the court
refused to find the policy overbroad because the court concluded that no
substantial danger existed that the policy would be applied to limit stu-
dents' First Amendment rights.30 3 Moreover, the student's vagueness
claim failed because evidence showed that the student knew and under-
stood the school policy.304
296. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).
297. Id. at 1179-80.
298. See id. at 1179.
299. Id. at 1183.
300. See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204 Bd. of Educ., No. 07 C 1586,
2007 WL 1141597, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007).
301. West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir.
2000).
302. See id.
303. See id. at 1368.
304. See id.
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Although these cases are encouraging in that they indicate that First
Amendment jurisprudence may be beginning to change to balance free
speech concerns with the protection of other rights, the most recent
speech code case involving a sexual harassment policy at Temple Univer-
sity indicates that courts are not yet willing to extend this approach to
colleges and universities.30 5 In this case, a graduate student sought injunc-
tive relief against a sexual harassment policy that he claimed chilled his
speech about "social, cultural, political and/or religious views" regarding
women in the military.3 0 6 Temple's policy provided that:
All forms of sexual harassment are prohibited, including ... ex-
pressive, visual or physical conduct of a sexual or gender-moti-
vated nature, when . . . (c) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work, edu-
cational performance, or status; or (d) such conduct has the pur-
pose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment.3 0 7
In holding that the policy was facially overbroad and therefore uncon-
stitutional, the Third Circuit began its analysis with a statement that ex-
plained free speech's fundamental importance on college campuses.3 08
The court specifically contrasted speech in the college environment to
speech in the elementary and high school settings by finding that adminis-
trators have substantially more leeway to regulate speech in the K-12 set-
ting because of the "special needs of school discipline" with younger
students. 3 0 9 Additionally, the Court reaffirmed that no "harassment ex-
ception" to the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause exists.3 10
Turning to the specific language of Temple's policy, the court took
particular issue with the language focusing on the motives of the
speaker.3 1 1 The specific language from the policy prohibited conduct that
had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work, educational performance, or status.312 Under Tinker, speech can
only be constitutionally regulated when it substantially disrupts the school
operations or creates a true threat to an individual's educational experi-
ence; purpose alone cannot be the basis for regulating speech.3 1 3 The
court questioned whether the policy's language of "unreasonably interfer-
305. See DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008).
306. Id. at 305.
307. Id.
308. See id. at 315.
309. See id.
310. See id. at 316.
311. See id. at 317.
312. See id. at 316.
313. See id. at 317.
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ing" satisfied Tinker's standard of "substantially interfering," which incor-
porates a severe and pervasive requirement.3 14
The court also found the policy's use of "hostile," "offensive," and
"gender-motivated" problematic because the terms were too subjective
and broad. The court suggested that the general terms would need to be
coupled to a "requirement akin to a showing of severity and pervasiveness
... a requirement that the conduct objectively and subjectively creates a
hostile environment or substantially interferes with an individual's
work." 15 Without such a requirement, the policy unconstitutionally regu-
lated protected speech.3 1 6 Furthermore, the use of the term "gender-mo-
tivated" created its own set of issues, including determining whose gender
must serve as the motivation and what gender exactly means.3 17
This case effectively illustrates that drafting a constitutional code of
conduct or speech code remains very difficult for universities and colleges.
Its difficulty causes some universities and colleges to forgo passing any pol-
icy due to fear that it will violate the First Amendment. Nonetheless, this is
a mistake because policies send a strong message to students regarding
tolerance and civility and can be drafted to the extent allowed by law.3 1 8
Conducting a study of 100 colleges with enacted speech codes, Professor
Jon B. Gould-an Associate Professor at George Mason University and the
Director of the Center for Justice, Law & Society-accurately identified
the current dilemma colleges face concerning speech codes.3 1 9 On the
one hand, they fear lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of their
speech codes.3 20 Failing to have policies and procedures in place, how-
ever, may be evidence of a hostile or intimidating environment that could
result in liability under Title VII or Title IX.3 2 1 Gould argues that colleges
and universities can draft policies that withstand constitutional scrutiny,
and should do that as a matter of social policy.3 22 The fact that colleges
and universities can withstand constitutional scrutiny is evidenced by the
fact that only 9% of the 100 colleges he studied had unconstitutional hate-
speech codes.
Until current First Amendment jurisprudence changes to reflect a
more thoughtful balance between freedom of speech rights and other
rights protecting the dignity of individuals, colleges, and universities must
be mindful of the strict parameters courts have developed concerning col-
314. See id. at 319-20.
315. Id. at 317-18.
316. See id. at 318.
317. See id.
318. See Jon B. Gould, Returning Fire, CHRON. HIGHER EDUc. (Wash., D.C.),
Apr. 20, 2007, at 13.
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id.
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legiate speech codes. Policies can regulate certain categories of speech
and conduct without violating the constitution. These categories include:
* Lewd and obscene speech;
* Profane speech;
* Libelous speech;
* Insulting or fighting words that by their very utterance tend to
incite an immediate breach of peace;
* Actions that "materially and substantially interfere with the re-
quirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school;"
* Threats of violence. 32 3
Phrases to be avoided unless they are connected with a severe or pervasive
requirement include:
* Speech that "stigmatizes" or "victimizes;"
* Speech that creates an "intimidating, hostile or demeaning
environment;"
* Speech that "tends to disturb" or "offend;"
* Speech that "demeans" a person.3 24
D. Creating Procedures for Reporting and Investigating Acts of Harassment,
Intimidation, or Bullying
College students need to know what to do if they encounter harass-
ment, intimidation, or bullying, especially because students are entering
into a new phase of independence and may be unsure how to report or
even be hesitant to report such victimization. Reporting incidents is even
more important on a college campus because campus employees have
more limited opportunities to observe bullying as opposed to teachers and
parents in the K-12 setting. Students need these procedures to get the
help they require, and universities need this information to help them
track the number of problematic instances occurring on their campuses.
This information will aid universities in identifying the nature and extent
of the problem to provide administrators with the data they need in de-
signing appropriate and effective action plans.
Universities may consider implanting a twenty-four-hour hotline.3 2 5
Officials should encourage bystanders, in addition to victims, to report in-
cidents because bystanders can serve a very valuable role in stopping a
culture of bullying.3 2 6 Whatever mechanisms colleges and universities
choose to adopt for reporting and investigating, they must be widely dis-
323. See Richard Kirk Page & Kay Hartwell Hunnicutt, Freedom for the Thought
that We Hate: A Policy Analysis of Student Speech Regulation at America's Twenty Largest
Public Universities, 21 J.C. & U.L. 1, 31-34 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
324. See id. at 34-37 (internal citations omitted).
325. See LENTz, supra note 249, at 330.
326. See id.
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seminated to the campus community. Repeated awareness campaigns
should be regularly scheduled and various vehicles should be utilized to
inform the campus community.
E. Providing Support for Victims of Bullying and Appropriate Consequences
and Remedial Action for Those Committing Harassment or Bullying, Falsely
Reporting, or Retaliating Against Someone Who Reports
Support for victims can be multifaceted. Counseling services should
be available and offered to a victim when appropriate. 327 Additionally,
certain protective measures could be implemented, including changes in
class sections or living arrangements to make the victim feel safe. Younger
children are often paired with a "buddy" and this solution should be ex-
plored to determine if it could be tailored to fit a college environment.3 2 8
When dealing with the perpetrator, colleges and universities must
vigilantly involve law enforcement when the conduct involves illegal behav-
ior. Normally, bullying conduct involves more than protected speech and
colleges and universities should be familiar with the laws, so they can ad-
vise their students on possible avenues of relief. For example, laws provide
protection from stalking, telephone harassment, unlawful restraint, as-
sault, hazing, hate crimes, and menacing.3 29 Colleges need to plan how to
coordinate with law enforcement and when to involve them.
In addition to formal legal proceedings, colleges and universities can
develop their own individual interventions and positive disciplinary tech-
niques. Colleges may consider conflict resolution measures. Peer media-
tion may not be particularly helpful because bullying centers upon a
power struggle and any mediation may further victimize the target.33 0 Fi-
nally, false reporting and retaliation should not be tolerated. Colleges and
universities need to develop policies detailing the consequences for engag-
ing in such behavior and communicate this to the campus community.
These recommendations may require a college to appoint a compli-
ance coordinator. A compliance coordinator could be the lead person for
an integrated school safety and violence prevention plan that would in-
clude efforts to combat bullying. Although bullying may be low on the
spectrum of school violence, if unfettered it can easily lead to more ex-
treme behaviors that can erupt into a crisis situation or result in a toxic
327. See id. at 326.
328. See id.
329. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Hate Crime Laws (2001), http://
www.adl.org/99hatecrime/provisions.asp (compiling states' hate crime statutes);
Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., Anti-Hazing Statutes, http://www.kappaalphapsi
1911.com/fratemity/laws1.asp (compiling list of states' anti-hazing statutes); Na-
tional Center for Victims of Crime, Criminal Stalking Laws By State (2010), http://
www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB State-byStateStatutes117 (compiling
states' criminal stalking laws). An example of a menacing statute can be found in
the Ohio statutes. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.22 (LexisNexis 2010).
330. See LENTz, supra note 249, at 326.
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school environment. Proactively dealing with bullying is an important and
often ignored step in making campuses safe.
V. CONCLUSION
Mechanisms to deal with bullying on college campuses have not been
uniform and systematic. This may be in part because little research exists
exploring the nature and frequency of college bullying. However, the re-
search documenting bullying in the K-12 school environment and the
workplace provide sufficient data about the detrimental effect bullying has
on the bully, the victim, and the bystanders to warrant similar investigation
into bullying on college campuses.
Assuming research will confirm that bullying does not disappear be-
tween high school and the workplace, college and university administra-
tors might still tend to ignore the issue because traditionally they have
been insulated from liability when a third party injures a student. Federal
statutes' requirements of severe and pervasive harm coupled with deliber-
ate indifference by the institution makes Title IX and 1983 remedies illu-
sory for most plaintiffs. Additionally, the establishment of duty has proven
difficult in traditional tort actions against a university because no duty ex-
ists simply based on the university-student relationship. First Amendment
concerns may also make colleges and universities reluctant to promulgate
any type of speech codes for fear of being sued.
Nevertheless, both legal and social reasons exist for addressing bully-
ing on campus. Recent cases hint that courts may be willing to revisit their
reluctance in finding colleges liable for injuries by third parties especially
when colleges exercise control and have undertaken a duty. Cases involv-
ing bullying are so novel that it is difficult to advise colleges and universi-
ties, but many of these cases are surviving motions to dismiss.
Furthermore, courts analyzing speech restrictions have been more lenient
when K-12 schools have sought to curb anti-homosexual and anti-racist
speech. To date, courts have not been willing to extend this analysis to
colleges and universities, yet as societal attitudes harden against bullying
and soften toward restrictions on speech, this may change. Colleges and
universities should pay careful attention to current legal developments in
this area.
Even more important than avoiding lawsuits, colleges and universities
should develop a multifaceted approach to bullying in order to foster an
environment that is safe and respectful. Bullying may be the precursor to
more harmful and violent behavior, but even if it is not, bullying nega-
tively affects both the victim and the bystanders in very real and concrete
ways.
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